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“As a writer once put it, we feel more at ease discussing other people’s tribalism  
and not our own.  And that is the problem in Kenya today.”  
 
-Walter O. Oyugi 
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 Introduction 
 
Prior to the presidential elections in December 2007, Kenya was viewed as one of 
the few politically stable and economically prosperous countries in Africa, a paradigm for 
other African countries to emulate.  At least this was the view held widely in the Western 
world.  Missing in this analysis were the growing ethnic tensions which, although not 
new to Kenya (the precedence was established during the colonial era), had grown 
increasingly volatile during the past two decades.  The 2007 election results revealed 
even sharper bitterness and divisions among Kenyans: “A day after President Mwai 
Kibaki was declared the winner of a second term, people who have lived as neighbors for 
decades in the Nairobi enclave began speaking of two Kenyas, one for the Kikuyu, 
Kibaki's tribe, and one for Luos and other ethnic groups loyal to opposition leader Raila 
Odinga, who says the vote was rigged.”1  Ethnic lines were clearly delineated and the 
country experienced two months of violence that left more than 1,000 people dead and 
300,000 people homeless.
2
  Much of the period leading up to the election was politically 
charged by ethnic hostilities as opposition leader Raila Odinga‟s supporters accused 
incumbent Kibaki of ethnic favoritism towards his Kikuyu community.
3
  It is important to 
note that the Kikuyu not only constitute the largest ethnic group in Kenya, but have 
dominated Kenya‟s political scene since the country gained independence from Great 
Britain in 1963.
4
  While Kibaki and Odinga reached a tenuous power-sharing agreement 
on February 28, 2008, the election left a coalition government and an elevated level of 
                                                             
1 Stephanie McCrummen, “Ethnic Fault Lines Emerge in Kenya‟s Post-Election Turmoil,” Washington 
Post, January 1, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/12/31/AR2007123100539.html (accessed December 6, 2010). 
2 Alert, Spring 2008, Vol. 11 No. 7, pg. 6. 
3 “Ethnic Fault Lines.” 
4 Ibid. 
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concern regarding prevailing ethnic hostilities.  One has to ask, would a sense of civic 
nationalism have averted the riots and the subsequent human and economic fallout? 
With ethnic identification increasingly becoming a polarizing force in political 
competitions in Kenya, it is in the best interest of the Kenyan government to reform its 
electoral policies and procedures to generate a change in incentives which promote civic 
nationalism as a way to counter the negative aspects of an ethnically diverse nation.  
Changes must be made in three key areas of the current electoral system: 
 Changing the current voting system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) to a closed list 
Proportional Representation (PR) system in parliamentary elections and to a two-
round system for presidential elections 
 Redefining and creating mechanisms for developing and enforcing better rules for 
political parties and campaigning 
 Reforming the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) to make it the predominant 
authority on electoral activities in Kenya.   
Using Kenya as a case study, this thesis focuses on how electoral reform can be utilized 
as one way to decrease the use of ethnicity as a political tool which currently creates 
unnecessary tensions.  Each chapter focuses on a different aspect of electoral reform: 
chapter one looks at changing the current voting system of first-past-the-post (FPTP) to a 
closed list Proportional Representation (PR) system in parliamentary elections and a two-
round voting system in presidential elections, chapter two addresses redefining and 
creating mechanisms for developing and enforcing better rules for political parties and 
campaigning, and finally, chapter three explores reforming the Electoral Commission of 
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Kenya (ECK) to make it the predominant authority on electoral activities in Kenya.  
These chapters will each be divided into four sections.    Starting from a historical 
perspective, the beginning of each chapter, Section A, looks at the foundation of ethnic 
division in Kenya resulting from colonization based on the topic of focus.  The electoral 
institutions and societal mechanisms established during the post-colonial struggle for 
independence are then discussed.  Section B provides an analysis of how the component 
being discussed in the chapter contributed to the violence of the 2007 elections.  This 
section details the repercussions and implications of the ethnically dominated violence 
that followed.  Section C presents the various reform options available.  Using other 
African countries as examples for successes, failures, and inspiration, this section 
explores how other African states have tackled the issues that surround multi-ethnic 
populations and the resulting conflicts.  It also looks at the recommendations of the 
Kriegler Commission which was charged with analyzing the 2007 elections and the 
resultant fallout.  Finally, Section D concludes each chapter by arguing for the best option 
that addresses the ethnic question in regards to its politicization in the electoral process 
and promotes civic nationalism over ethnically minded interests.    
History has played a large part in the influence of ethnicity in African politics.  
The impact has been exceptionally damaging: “owing to the extreme arbitrariness and 
artificiality of colonial era territorial demarcations and manipulations in Africa, the 
continent has the largest concentration of ethno-political minorities at risk in the world 
followed by Eastern Europe, Asia, the Western democracies, and Latin America in that 
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order.”5  The problem is amplified by the abuse of ethnic identity by African institutions 
from political parties to the government itself which repress and manipulate multi-ethnic 
ties instead of working towards accommodation and mediation.
6
  The use of ethnicity as a 
political weapon frequently takes center stage during elections because they offer an 
arena for the political competition that resonates in a country. The consequences of this 
use of ethnicity have global implications: “In Africa and beyond, ethnic (as well as 
religious and regional) identity conflicts have hobbled the capacity and legitimacy of 
governments, drained the integrity and unity of states, and ravaged the cohesion and 
coherence of civil societies.”7  It is the ordinary citizen who suffers the most from these 
conflicts; many of them become internally displaced persons, losing their homes, meager 
means of livelihood, and often family and friends.  The physical and psychological 
consequences of this violence and disruption of life are not easily repaired.  Political 
instability as a result of ethnic hostilities not only affects citizens, but has repercussions 
for neighboring countries which often have to assume responsibility for fleeing refugees, 
deal the fallout from sheltering rebels, and can take an economic hit if they lose a trading 
partner.  Globally, the rest of the world has to bear the responsibility for humanitarian 
relief as war torn countries face famine, disease, death, and the weight of internally 
displaced persons on large scales.  The devastation of the events that followed the 
Kenyan 2007 elections magnified these issues and placed them on the front pages of 
newspapers worldwide.   
                                                             
5 Goran Hyden and others, eds. African Perspectives on Governance, (Eritrea: Africa World Press, 2000), 
130. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 123. 
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Elections have been seen as the cornerstone for countries striving to become (or at 
least appear more) “democratic.”  Kenya is one of the many countries in Africa that has 
chosen to use elections as a means of selecting its leaders and members of government.  
This paper is not arguing for democracy in Kenya.  Rather, it is looking at an electoral 
system that has already been chosen and put in place.  It is not seeking to argue for „free 
and fair‟ elections but to address the ethnic component that is so prevalent in the process.  
The recommended reforms to the electoral system that are discussed throughout the paper 
regarding ethnicity will, however, likely cover some of the issues that fall under „free and 
fair.‟  Furthermore, it is not looking at regime change.  The ultimate focus is on how 
ethnicity is used as a political tool and what steps can be taken to change this negative 
use and works towards a sense of national unity.  As a case study, Kenya exposes the 
realities of ethnic divisions in Africa and demonstrates the need for African institutions at 
all levels to address the abuse of ethnic identities in political competition.  Suzanne 
Mueller argues the 2007 elections brought to light some of the shortcomings not only of 
Kenya‟s electoral system, but political competition as a whole: 
Kenyan political institutions have been subject to the power of a highly 
centralized and personalized presidency; that political parties have been 
driven by the desire of politicians to acquire access to state resources and 
patronage; that these political parties have focused overwhelmingly upon 
the necessity of winning; and that, as a result, elections in Kenya have 
become a „do or die zero-sum‟ exercise in which politicians have resorted 
both to appeals to ethnicity and the use of violence against opponents.  In 
turn, while neither political parties nor voters regard the Electoral 
Commission and the wider state administrative system as neutral, voters 
themselves are widely induced to vote along ethnic lines, not least because 
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of the fear of violence or „ethnic others‟ gaining advantage over their own 
communities.
8
    
 
These issues are encapsulated by one problem: the incentives in the current competitive 
political system are skewed by both politicians and voters alike.  The existing and 
dominate incentive is to gain or maintain power by whatever means necessary; hence the 
reliance on ethnicity for patronage and even violence if patronage is insufficient.  In order 
to overcome these factors, the priority of the ECK and ultimately the Kenyan government 
needs to be to change the incentives that currently dominate political competition.  This 
change can begin by reforming the present incentive system by means of the electoral 
system, focusing on civic nationalism as the end goal.  The promotion of civic 
nationalism would allow Kenyans to see themselves as Kenyans first and members of an 
ethnic community second.  The new incentives in political competition need to promote 
what is in the best interest of all Kenyans not what is best for one ethnic group.  The key 
lies in a process that leads to a government that is inclusive of all groups and of all 
interests in its policies and practices.  Whether this can be obtained through civic 
nationalism has been challenged by many political scientists.  One of the main criticisms 
of promoting a civic identity is that an attachment to a nation is not likely to replace 
loyalty to a group due to the greater emotional resonance in ethnic nationalism.
9
  While 
this argument has merit, especially given Kenya‟s historical background of ethnic 
division, involvement in various types of organizations from political parties to religious 
                                                             
8 Roger Southall, “Alternatives for electoral reform in Kenya: Lessons from southern Africa,” Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27 No. 3 (2009): 448. 
9 Stephen Shulman, “Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of 
Nationalism.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35 No. 5 (June 2002): 580. 
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groups can also elicit emotionally charged feelings and actions that can supercede ethnic 
loyalty.   
 Several different ways of using civic nationalism to combat ethnic divisions have 
been suggested which include: 
 The promotion of a single language  
 The emphasis of ethnic peace in educational systems  
 The abolition of traditional chiefs 
  And electoral reform 
What makes electoral reform stand out among these options in Kenya is that it provides 
an opportunity for the government and politicians to work through an established 
institution (elections) that is already accepted by the people.  By focusing specifically on 
the electoral system in promoting civic nationalism in ethnically diverse countries, 
African states can begin to build trust between themselves and the people, negating some 
of the criticisms of civic nationalism.  What is crucial is emphasizing the importance of 
the system and portraying the benefits of such a system directly to the people.  If a state 
can provide support for ethnic and cultural components of a society through state and 
political institutions, while not letting these features dominate the system, civic 
nationalism can garner support.  While clearly it will take more than simply reforming 
the electoral system, encompassing change from voting structures to political parties to 
the ECK, these three areas of electoral reform provide visible changes for creating a 
political competition based on civic nationalism.  Since elections draw both national and 
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international attention, they present a prime opportunity to encourage politicians and 
voters to begin thinking nationally, not ethnically.  
Examining theory and terminology behind ethnic groups provides a basis for 
understanding why ethnicity remains a prominent source of identification in Africa.  
Throughout this thesis, ethnic group refers to: “an ascriptive social collectivity whose 
members not only share such objective characteristics as group name, core territory, 
language, ancestral myths, culture, religion, and/or political organization, but also possess 
some subjective consciousness or perception of common identity or descent.”10  Ethnicity 
will denote: “the mobilization and politicization of ethnic-group identity in situations of 
competitive or conflictual pluralism.”11 How ethnic groups function within states varies 
based on structural components of ethnicity.  One distinction is ranked ethnic groups 
versus unranked ethnic classification, where ranked ethnic groups are based on socio-
economic terms or class that result in a stratification of ethnic groups creating a hierarchy 
whereas in unranked ethnic classification class has no bearing.
12
  While most African 
countries are characterized by unranked ethnic groups, a few ethnic systems such as 
Rwanda and Apartheid South Africa provide examples of ranked ethnic classifications.
13
  
The greater number of unranked ethnic groups is significant as an important element of 
this group is their highly competitive political orientation while ranked systems are often 
more ideologically and socially entrenched.
14
  This emphasizes the need to monitor 
                                                             
10 Hyden, 124. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 126. 
13 Ibid., 127. 
14 Ibid. 
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political structures more closely in unranked systems in order to avoid conflict that 
potentially could arise due to the increase in political competitiveness. 
Another factor that differs amongst states is ethnic systems that are centralized 
and ethnic systems that are dispersed.  Ethnically centralized states are characterized by a 
few large ethnic groups that enjoy demographic or socio-economic predominance over 
other groups and, as a result, can polarize all aspects of national politics through their 
interactions and frictions.
15
  Countries such as Kenya and Uganda are examples of 
relatively centralized ethnic states.  Geographically, ethnic populations can be 
concentrated or intermixed.  Although geographically concentrated ethnic groups still 
encapsulate most African states, urbanization and migration has increased the prevalence 
of intermixed ethnic groups, especially in cities.
16
  Geography can have a significant 
influence on conflict between ethnic groups as, “It is broadly recognized that 
geographically concentrated ethnic structures are relatively more conducive to inter-
ethnic peace, not only because inter-ethnic intercourse and friction are less socially 
prevalent in such contexts but also because geographical concentration of identity groups 
facilitates the implementation of federalist and other territorial formulas of ethnic 
conflict-management.”17  All of these distinctions can help to explain the role that 
ethnicity plays in individual countries throughout Africa.  However, while these features 
help categorize countries, they are not always indicative of whether ethnic conflict might 
arise. 
                                                             
15 Hyden, 127. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 127-128. 
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 There is still much debate on why and to what degree ethnicity has been able to 
infiltrate the political and social structures of many African societies, but there are two 
main theories about the role of ethnicity as a key source of identification in Africa: (1) 
ethnic identities reflect a sense of tradition where ethnicity is fundamentally part of a 
people (primordialists), and (2) ethnicity is a dominate feature because it serves a 
functional purpose in society (situationalists).
18
  The importance of the primodialist 
theory is its critical function in helping to explain the psychological role of ethnic groups 
in African societies and perhaps ascribe part of the reason ethnic conflicts often result in 
violence.  However, the situationalist argument addresses why politicization of ethnic 
groups often occurs.  Ethnic groups provide “a contingent malleable or pliable self-
classification that is often contrived by elites and their constituents to obtain economic or 
other non-ethnic rewards.”19  The state, through governments and political figures, plays 
a large role in how ethnic groups serve as a tool, utilized in social and political settings.  
As an “organizing principle,” the state can animate, define, and frame the ethnic 
behaviors of a country.
20
  The impact of ethnicity on a society can be greatly influenced 
by political instruments created by the state to mediate and regulate the competition 
amongst ethnic groups.  Scholars have identified three institutional paradigms African 
states tend to resort to in dealing with ethnicity: hegemonic repression, hegemonic 
exchange, and polyarchial or non-hegemonic exchange.
21
  Hegemonic repression 
involves state power being controlled by one-party, often a military regime.  The danger 
                                                             
18 Benn Eifert and others, “Political Competition and Ethnic Identification in Africa.” American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 54 No. 2 (April 2010): 494-520. 
19 Hyden, 125. 
20 Ibid., 126. 
21 Ibid., 130. 
12 
 
of hegemonic repression is that it alienates certain groups while providing privileges for 
another which can often result in rebellion or resistance.  Hegemonic exchange combines 
both elements of an authoritarian government with special rules, policies and practices 
intended to deal with diverse ethnic groups.  Kenya, under the leadership of Jomo 
Kenyatta, provides an example of a period of hegemonic exchange regime as Kenyatta 
strove to balance his position as leader of the Kenyan nation with that as a patron of the 
Kikuyu ethnic group.
22
  Even though hegemonic exchange regimes attempt to create a 
sense of stability between state-ethnic and interethnic relations, ultimately, the dominant 
tendency is to manipulate and appropriate ethnic relations in a way that helps secure the 
survival of the hegemony in power.
23
  And because there is a tendency of rulers to focus 
on self-survival, any ethnic networks or linkages established often disintegrate with the 
rise of a new political order as the ethnic relations are based on informal, personal 
relationships as opposed to formal agreements or constitutional rules.
24
  This is further 
extenuated by the role of patrimonialism in African politics, where competition for 
resources and ethno-clientelistic patronage networks dominate government actions over 
the development of progressive and policy oriented objectives to manage ethnic 
divisions.
25
  Polyarchical exchange involves a liberal democracy regime that utilizes the 
rule of law and special institutions to address ethnic divides.
26
  Four devices drive ethnic 
interactions and management in a polyarchial exchange regime: democracy, autonomism, 
                                                             
22 Hyden, 134. 
23 Ibid., 133 and 135. 
24 Ibid., 135. 
25 Ibid., 136. 
26 Ibid. 
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proportionality, and minority rights.
27
  In this type of governance, the focus is not on 
manipulating ethnicity but creating institutions that effectively address the concerns that 
develop as a result of ethnic pluralism.  The overall goal that governments should strive 
for in regards to ethnicity can be summarized as thus: “governance as an approach to 
ethnicity would seek to identify and create rules and institutions that may promote equity 
and amity in inter-ethnic and/or state-ethnic relations and generally channel ethnicity 
along constructive, rather than oppressive or destructive lines.”28 However, the 
establishment of these mechanisms by governments has been anything but stable.  
Nigeria provides an example of a country that embraced polyarchial exchange but slowly 
deteriorated into a repressive military hegemonic regime.
29
  Where it is difficult to 
establish a stable form of government, the challenges facing the implementation of a 
legitimate electoral system is even greater.               
 Ethnicity in Africa has emerged as a result of political competition established 
and promoted by those in and seeking power.  Serving as a political tool, ethnicity is used 
for: “mobilizing people, policing boundaries, and building coalitions that can be deployed 
in the struggle for power and scarce resources.”30  Two dominant features can be 
distinguished in the use of ethnic groups as a tool: (1) the promotion of ethnic identities is 
employed to gain state-controlled power and (2) they are used to exploit economic 
resources.  The reliance on ethnicity for political competition flourishes during times of 
presidential, parliamentary, constitutional, and general elections.  The two key 
mechanisms that support the increased importance of ethnic identity revolving around 
                                                             
27 Hyden, 143. 
28 Ibid., 124-125. 
29 Ibid., 138. 
30 Eifert, 494. 
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elections are the same as stated above: the control of state-power and economic 
resources.  In elections, “ethnic identities are tools that people use to get access to 
political power.”31  Elections renew awareness of the political power that is at stake and 
therefore impact the electoral process by emphasizing ethnic identity above all else:  
First, it is widely recognized that the growth and concentration of 
resources in the state has increased the salience of state control for ethnic 
groups as much as for individuals, and, hence, has produced a zero sum 
ethnic struggle for political power.  Second, with the whole process of 
class formation and consolidation at stake for the political class, 
politicians have been prone to manipulate ethnic attachments and tears as 
a means both for mobilizing electoral support and for diverting attention 
from their own corrupt accumulation and abuse of power.
32
    
 
In the time leading up to elections, many politicians embrace the psychological influence 
of ethnic identity and thus “play the ethnic card” in an attempt to bolster support.  This 
tactic brings ethnicity to the forefront of voters‟ minds and displaces other identities like 
membership in religious communities, a particular socio-economic class, and gender 
categories.
33
 Political leaders encourage this emergence of ethnocentrism during elections 
because it is one of the easiest ways to mobilize support.   
This ease of mobilizing support is due in large part to the second force that comes 
into play during elections (one that politicians do not even have to embrace as a tactic), 
the competition for economic resources.  Without politicians vocalizing the fact, voters 
recognize the historical importance of ethnic groups in the distribution of economic 
resources.  The allocation of resources in Africa historically follows ethnic lines and 
election results determine who will be distributing the resources.
34
  At both the local and 
                                                             
31 Eifert, 494. 
32 Hyden, 128-129.  
33 Eifert, 495. 
34 Ibid. 
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national level, leaders often allocate to their ethnic groups considerable economic 
resources as a way to maintain political influence and control over various ethnic 
groups.
35
  As a result of the politicization of ethnic identities, ethnic group loyalties move 
beyond the private sphere into the public sphere.
36
  Beyond the command of blood-
relationships, ethnic solidarity provides economic security.  This economic security, goes 
outside competition between ethnic groups, but is the means for survival.  A fear that has 
been planted in many African populations is that without a member of their ethnic group 
in power, they will increasingly face a daily struggle to survive.  This reliance on 
patronage in regards to economic resources essentially enables leaders to buy support 
from their ethnic group.
37
  But the problem of the use of ethnicity in elections goes 
deeper than just its exploitation: “participation in public affairs is reduced to a game of 
advocating ethnic interests rather than building structures that can guarantee equal 
participation, justice, and development for all.  Consequently, people no longer see hard 
work as the source of economic success.”38  The repercussion of a political system reliant 
on ethnic mobilization is that the focus of elections shifts from voting for what is best for 
a country regarding economic performance, health services, education, and the common 
good.
 39
  The focus is shifted solely to enabling a certain ethnic group to control the state.  
While multi-party politics may have been introduced in many African states in the 
1990‟s, these political parties typically became groups divided along ethnic lines.  The 
emphasis to keep their ethnic group member in power has increasingly led to the isolation 
                                                             
35 Aquiline Tarimo, “Politicization of Ethnic Identities: The Case of Contemporary Africa.” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 45 (2010): 303. 
36 Ibid., 304. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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of the less dominant ethnic groups: “Those who belong to the less dominant ethnic 
groups feel left out and discriminated against by the system.  In turn, they feel obliged to 
act, legally or illegally, to ensure their survival.  The tendency of self-assertion emerging 
from different ethnic groups for survival is, in fact, the root cause of the widespread 
conflicts in Africa today.”40  It is still largely debated to what extent ethnicity plays a role 
in the conflicts that afflict much of the African continent, but, clearly it plays a part in the 
instability of many African electoral institutions.  The weight placed on ethnicity during 
elections has created a cycle of dependence as both politicians and voters feel obligated 
to utilize their ethnic groups as a way to survive. 
The link between political competition and ethnic identification in Africa has led 
to the exercise of exploiting ethnic groups, particularly in periods surrounding elections.  
A study conducted by Benn Eifert, et al., evaluated data from over 35,000 respondents in 
22 public opinion surveys conducted in 10 countries between 1999 and 2004 on the 
political sources of ethnic identification.
41
  Their studies were founded on two key 
hypotheses: first, as ethnic identities provide a way for people to access political power, 
during election times when power is at stake, these identities are likely to become more 
salient; and second, that ethnicity will become an even greater factor in a highly 
contested and competitive election.
42
  Their findings supported ethnicity as instrumental 
in political competitions as a result of the close correspondence between ethnic 
identification and the electoral cycle.
43
  Most significantly, they found that political 
                                                             
40 Tarimo, 305. 
41 Eifert, 497.  The ten countries where these surveys were distributed were:  Botswana, Malawi, Mali, 
Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
42 Ibid., 494. 
43 Ibid., 495. 
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competition raises salience of ethnic identity for all citizens.
44
  Ethnic attachments in the 
countries studied were found to be the strongest during periods preceding and following 
competitive national elections.  This is in part due to the increased use of the “ethnic 
card” played by politicians to rally support as well as the persistent weight of resources 
on the minds of the voters.  Regular citizens (versus elites) are often the most impacted 
by this secondary influence as they rely on the belief that jobs, favors, and public goods 
will be disproportionately directed to co-ethnics of the person in power who controls 
them.
45
  The question that arises is to what extent voters are being manipulated versus 
how much politicians are simply playing into their expectations.  The role of these two 
factors has resulted in an electoral cycle in Africa: 
 Politicians will only invoke the need for voters to support members of 
their ethnic groups if they believe that such appeals will resonate, which in 
turn will depend on voters‟ beliefs about how patronage is channeled in 
Africa.  Similarly, although most citizens do not need to be reminded that 
their ethnic connection with the election‟s winner is likely to affect the 
level of resource they will receive in the election‟s aftermath, politicians‟ 
ethnic appeals almost certainly reinforce such expectations.  The result is 
an equilibrium in which expectations of ethnic favoritism by voters 
generate ethnic appeals by politicians which, in turn, reinforce voters‟ 
expectations of ethnic favoritism.
46
   
 
This cycle creates a dangerous precedent for voters and politicians.  Even if just one 
political party resorts to the promotion of ethnic identity, it can begin a process of 
ethnicization of all political parties.  Opposition parties often start this process by 
                                                             
44 Eifert, 496.  The study looked at certain theories regarding ethnicity to analyze the range of the 
population that political competition impacted as far as ethnic identification.  First was the theory that 
group size creates incentives for ethnic mobilization.  The study did not find evidence of the size of ethnic 
group affecting ethnic identification.  Second, the study looked at whether supporters of current ruling 
parties were more or less likely to ethnically identify themselves.  The study found these supporters to be 
no different than supporters of parties that were not in power.  Finally, the study explored the idea of young 
men as especially likely to identify ethnically.  Again the results found there to be no significant evidence 
that this particular subset of the population was more likely to identify in ethnic terms.   
45 Ibid., 507. 
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criticizing the ruling party for discriminating against members of other ethnic groups.
47
  
The ruling party often responds with a counter-mobilization of its ethnic group.  
Consequently, ethnicity persistently becomes the focus of elections in Africa.     
The cyclical nature of ethnic hostilities in Africa frequently compliments election 
cycles.  Political competition has fallen into a pattern of utilizing ethnicity as a tool to 
win elections.  This precedent needs to be altered but the current indifference by African 
leaders makes resolving this problem challenging: “The problem in Africa so far has been 
the little interest that the continent‟s political leaders have shown in dealing with 
ethnicity in terms of constitutional and legal provisions that enable people to feel secure 
and governments able to manage this set of issues in a manner constructive to both itself 
and its citizens.”48  Political leaders seem to have a larger interest in using ethnicity for 
personal benefit than for the greater good of the people.  Because elections make 
ethnicity more salient, one of the ways to address this mobilization is for African 
governments to develop policies and institutional mechanisms regarding the electoral 
process that limit the destructive use of ethnic divisions.
 49
  Since ethnic identities are 
strengthened by political competition, these policies and institutions need to focus on the 
electoral process and other political instruments that lead to competition: “much can still 
be done to institutionalize, improve, and expand proportionality practices in Africa, 
especially through the design of electoral systems that may secure inter-ethnic 
moderation, toleration, and coalition by inducing and compelling candidates and parties 
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to seek electoral support across ethnic boundaries.”50  These changes in structure and 
practices can only be implemented by promoting a larger goal that explains the need for 
structural adjustment.  The new electoral system should encourage nationalism.  
In regards to Kenya and many other multi-ethnic countries in Africa, the problem 
with the current electoral system is its support of a precarious type of nationalism.  The 
theory behind using nationalism as a means to unify a country is that it provides an 
effective way to center the focus of a nation to the common good of all.  However, this is 
not the case with all types of nationalism.  There are two dominant types of nationalism: 
civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.
51
  Key components of civic nationalism include: 
territory, citizenship, will and consent, political ideology, and political institutions and 
rights.
52
  The key difference between civic and ethnic nationalism is what state structures 
put into focus.  Ethnic nationalism directs focus to common language, religion, customs, 
and traditions of a country while civic nationalism turns focus to a shared set of political 
practices and values.
53
  While civic nationalism centers on a sense of equal community, 
ethnic nationalism emphasizes trust only from those in your own blood line.
54
  This 
element of trust in political institutions that civic nationalism provides is essential as it 
promotes unity of a whole instead of just a part.  But trust in political institutions in 
Africa is not easily come by.  Many African countries have turned to ethno-nationalism 
                                                             
50 Hyden, 145. 
51 Shulman, 559.  Some scholars have argued the existence of a third type of nationalism, that of cultural 
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because of mistrust in political institutions.
55
  These “civic deserts” can partially be 
explained by the effects of colonization which often destroyed the civic societies that 
were previously established.  Once these countries gained independence, the newness of 
these states and regimes made it difficult to establish political and legal institutions that 
were often unfamiliar.
56
  Ethnic nationalism, therefore “fills an institutional vacuum.”57  
When civic institutions have failed in the eyes of the population, ethnic nationalism 
becomes the default option: “It predominates when institutions collapse, when existing 
institutions were not fulfilling people‟s basic needs, and when satisfactory alternative 
structures are not readily available.”58  Since many African countries have fallen into this 
pattern, it makes the establishment of stable civic structures more and more challenging 
each time one fails.  This is why the state needs to first focus on reform of electoral 
institutions.  Trying to tackle the whole political system is too grand an idea and one that 
does not directly relate to the people; however, by creating an election process where 
citizens can actively participate and express their opinions in a legitimate forum, the state 
can portray positive reform in an effort to implement a stable and trustworthy 
government.  Reform in the electoral process and institutions is one small step to building 
a country based on civic nationalism and not ethnic divisions. 
In countries with not only ethnically diverse populations but ones with numerous 
languages, religions, and traditions, uniting a country already divided by ethnic 
nationalism proves exceedingly difficult.  However, civic nationalism does not mean that 
the ethnic components of a country cease to exist: “A truly civic conception of the nation 
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entails no need for cultural unity.  People in a purely civic nation are united by such traits 
as common citizenship, respect for law and state institutions, belief in a set of political 
principles, and so forth.  Similarity in language, religion, and other cultural markers is not 
necessary for the development of such traits.”59  This strategy means that ethnic groups 
can still exist within the nation; they just do not dominate state institutions.  From the 
promotion of community trust to the maintenance of the cultural aspects of different 
ethnic groups, civic nationalism has the potential to positively transform a state and shift 
the public‟s attention from ethnically motivated actions to those for the greater good.          
An electoral system that is not dominated by ethnicity will lead to a decrease in 
ethnic tensions.  While ethnic groups and cultural traditions remain intact and continue to 
be a source of identification, in a political system that encourages the good of the whole, 
in times of political competition, ethnicity will not be wielded as a weapon by the 
opposition and a tool by incumbents.  The stability that results from an unyielding 
electoral system in regards to the use of ethnicity can provide the groundwork for 
stability to spread to other government institutions such as areas of economics, health, 
and safety.  This stability will continue to undermine reliance on ethnicity for power, and 
will increase the mechanisms available for all people as a means for survival.  By 
reforming a small part of the larger political system, African governments can begin to 
encourage ethnic groups to work together for their common good
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Chapter 1- 
First-Past-The-Post 
 
“To imagine that with the stroke of a pen what is defective will be made 
good, that it will be easy to reverse 45 years of post-colonial, stumbling 
democracy.” 
-The Kriegler Commission 
 
 
The first-past-the-post (FPTP) election system was inherited from Great Britain.  In this 
style of voting, an election is won by the candidate who receives the most votes.  The candidate 
does not have to receive a majority of the votes to win.  This voting system encourages a zero-
sum style of politics which, in a country like Kenya, leads to ethnic campaigning because losing 
an election means the loss of power and the loss of resources associated with that power.
1
  The 
concern is that this system has at times led to varying levels of ethnic cleansing due to the 
ideology that in order for one ethnic group to win another must lose.  In order to diminish the 
current zero-sum mentality of political competition in Kenya, the voting system needs to be 
changed to a closed list PR system in parliamentary elections and to a two-round system in 
presidential elections.   
 
Section A- Colonialism: Majimboism and Land 
Colonial practices largely influenced the emergence of ethnically centered institutions 
throughout Kenyan society.  With the establishment of the FPTP system in the late colonial/post-
colonial era, its limitations began to shape ethnicity in Kenya.  The Mau Mau freedom fighters, 
formed during colonial rule in the 1950s and who essentially initiated the struggle for 
independence, represent a momentous struggle for land in Kenya‟s history that resulted in 
violence.  Their eventual victory led to one of Kenya‟s greatest land grabs that continues to cause 
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problems today (see Chapter 2 for a more in-depth discussion of the role of Mau Mau).  In the 
period leading up to independence, Kenyan leaders had a choice to make regarding state 
structures that would ultimately determine electoral institutions.  The two dominant parties at 
independence, which were formed along ethnic lines, prescribed different structures of 
government.  The Kenyan African Democratic Party (KADU) promoted a federal structure of 
government based on regional responsibility for the administration of land in the designated 
territories known as Majimbo.
2
  Majimboism was essentially ethnic based federalism.
3
  KADU‟s 
endorsement of this style of government was based on the idea of recovery of traditional 
territories by certain ethnic groups (specifically in the White Highlands which would leave the 
Kalenjin and Masai with native rights to the land as settlers left), back to the pre-colonial land 
spheres prior to the migration of ethnic groups that occurred during the colonial period.
4
  Critics 
of this system, however, argued that Majimboism would lead to larger community expansion into 
smaller communities, which would potentially threaten minority ethnic groups.
5
  In contrast, the 
Kenyan African National Union (KANU), predominately comprised of Kikuyu and Luo ethnic 
groups, sponsored a unitary government committed to upholding and respecting property rights.
6
  
Despite these differences, each party was concerned with which ethnic groups would obtain the 
land in the White Highlands.  This issue became the center of the creation of the Kenyan state.  
The fight between ethnic groups for land control was begun and then greatly exacerbated under 
colonial rule, making it difficult for the post-colonial government to look beyond ethnic groups 
when creating government structures.   
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5 Ibid.    
6 Ibid.  This is in large part due Kikuyu movement into the White Highlands during colonial rule, land they 
would obviously not want to give up. 
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As the colonial government slowly began to unwind, African groups began to promote 
the re-Africanization of the White Highlands due to its agricultural wealth.  This process, 
however, led to the emergence of landless squatters, specifically the Kikuyu, who had comprised 
a large contingent of the Mau Mau freedom fighters, who were threatening to reassemble if they 
were not given some of the land they deemed was owed to them.
7
  The Kikuyu squatters further 
antagonized the relations between the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin and as a result, the government‟s 
abilities to take ethnicity out of the equation were hindered: “The re-Africanisation of the White 
Highlands and increased focus on the Kikuyu ethnicised the land question and cultivated 
conditions for mobilizing ethnicity as a means of accessing land rights.”8  Attempting to address 
the landless people issue, the government implemented a string of settlement schemes, however, 
these plans fell short of fulfilling the land desires of all the landless people and they also 
contained an ethnic dimension: “A larger number of beneficiaries who were Kikuyu, compared 
with those form other communities, created a perception that the schemes were meant to satisfy 
land hunger among Kikuyu rather than any other community.”9  As the issues surrounding the 
land questions morphed into ethnic components, the spillover was seen in national politics.  The 
Regional Boundaries Commission of 1962 drew new district boundaries that were largely 
ethnically based, with groups seeking to be together or separated from others depending on 
perceived land threats.
10
  The large resettlement of Kikuyu in traditionally Masai and Kalenjin 
territory “aroused ethnic animosity and tensions, adding to tensions that accompanied hostility 
around the negotiations for independence.”11  Instead of concentrating on obtaining independence 
of the Kenyan people as a whole, the focus was on ethnicity.             
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With the KANU victory in pre-independence elections in 1963, the new administration 
under President Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) commenced land reform under the auspices of a 
unitary form of government seeking economic stability, thereby squashing the demand for the 
sanctity of traditional ethnic territories.
12
  Throughout the 1960s the new administration sought to 
ensure economic stability by addressing the largest source of political unrest at the time, that of 
the Kikuyu landless in the Rift Valley.
13
  Desire for the control of land manifested itself in 
political and economic security and resources as ethnic groups gained political power.  However, 
the continual competition for land, exacerbated by land-buying companies, intensified inter-
ethnic rivalries as elite members used them to increase their social bases of power, thus 
consolidating the political positions of their ethnic groups.
14
  Although there was a relative period 
of calm in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s under President Moi, as his interests were aligned with that of 
the Kikuyu landed, the 1990‟s saw the re-emergence of ethnic campaigns regarding land.15  As 
political (inherently ethnic) groups mobilized around land issues, violence related to land began 
to follow election cycles.
16
   
The Rift Valley has played a large role in violence that breaks out during elections due to 
its historically significant role in Kenya‟s national politics.  It is a multi-ethnic region 
encompassing Kalenjin, Masai, Kikuyu, and Luhya ethnic groups.  The region has the largest 
share of total national votes and parliamentary constituencies, making it appealing for parties to 
obtain political seats by focusing on the various ethnic blocs in this single area.
17
  And finally, 
like the former White Highlands, ethnic political competition to gain land has been a dominant 
feature of the region, resulting in ethnically motivated violence.
18
 The Rift Valley presents a 
                                                             
12 Kanyinga, 329.    
13 Ibid., 335.    
14 Ibid., 333.    
15 Ibid., 337-338.    
16 Ibid., 338.    
17 Ibid., 326.  
18 Ibid. 
26 
 
prime example of why the current voting system causes more damage to Kenyan society than it 
does good. 
Based on historical experience, while the FPTP system helped establish electoral 
practices in Kenya, the plurality system lends itself to widespread corruption and manipulation by 
incumbent ruling parties which has been seen through the management of land.
19
  The period 
leading up to the 2007 elections saw many of the same patterns emerge. 
 
Section B- Zero-Sum Mentality 
Resentment regarding land allocation and ownership continued to taint the political 
process in the period before the 2007 elections.  Regarding the constitutional referendum in 2005, 
“It was said that the proposed constitution was defeated because the Kikuyu political elite, who 
were in central positions in government, were not keen to share political power with other tribes.  
Issues of land and the domination of Kikuyu in the settlement schemes in the Rift Valley shaped 
those perceptions.  The ensuing conflicts were an expression of resentment over wrongs arising 
from how land issues were addressed.”20  Majimboists re-emerged under the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM), which supported federalism as the best way for policy to be pursued so that 
people could make decisions on matter specifically concerning their regions.
21
  In contrast, the 
Party of National Unity (PNU) argued against Majimbo, claiming that such a policy would 
undermine national unity.
22
  Representation at all government levels was obviously a concern of 
both the constituents and political parties.  The 2007 elections saw 2548 candidates in the race for 
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only 210 seats in Kenya‟s National Assembly (parliament), based on single-member 
constituencies.
23
 
 Instances of violence sprung up prior to the election based on trying to dissuade voter 
turnout.  For example, “In Kuresoi, violence continued up to a few weeks preceding the 2007 
December general election and may have been aimed at reducing voter turnout for the multi-
ethnic Kuresoi parliamentary constituency.”24  The current FPTP system encourages these 
practices as the zero-sum mentality it perpetuates leads people to take drastic measures to ensure 
the vote goes in their favor.   
 
Section C- Reform Options 
Kenya needs a system of electoral voting that does not emphasize the winner-take-all 
approach that FPTP currently props up.  The current delimitation of boundaries used in these 
voting structures does not represent the basic principle of the equality of the vote.
25
  Kenya needs 
a system that will incentivize political parties and politicians to compete for votes across ethnic 
lines.  The Kriegler Commission, charged with analyzing the 2007 elections, provided a few 
alternatives to the current FPTP system
26
: 
 A two-round presidential and parliamentary system 
 Mixed-Member Proportional representation (MMP) based on one ballot (requiring 
changing the current constituency structure) 
 Closed list proportional representation (PR) at the provincial level (emphasizing „gender 
zipping‟ to increase fairer representation of women) 
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 Closed list PR (also emphasizing „gender zipping‟ to increase fairer representation of 
women) at the national level 
 
These alternatives will be discussed by addressing parliamentary and presidential systems 
separately as each encompasses its own set of issues and requires different remedies.   
 
Parliamentary Electoral Reform Options 
Of course the easiest approach to electoral reform with minimal change would be to 
maintain the FPTP system but alter constituencies to promote a more equitable delimitation of 
ethnic groups.  While limited change might be less challenging to implement in the short run, 
simply changing constituencies will not change the inherent problems that plague the FPTP 
system.  It would fail to eliminate the winner/loser mentality as winning parties would still have a 
disproportionally larger number of seats relative to the votes cast for the losing party.
27
  It would 
be very easy for ruling parties to skew the constituency boundaries in a way that was 
advantageous to the party during elections.  The manipulation of constituency delimitations is 
also problematic in rural areas as they have been principally based around ethnic groups, which 
further encourages the politicization of ethnicity.
28
  The result is the creation of the ethnic „other,‟ 
whereby ethnic hostilities are cultivated.  This then prompts political alliances centered on ethnic 
arithmetic.
29
  Both of these issues leave the zero-sum mentality at the forefront of voting, 
allowing ethnicity to continue to dominate the system.  If such a system were to work, the key 
would be a neutral constituency delimitation process that aimed at equalizing the „weight‟ of 
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individual votes.
30
  The success of this would be based on the public trust placed on the neutrality 
of the re-districting constituencies.
31
 
The two-round system of parliamentary elections changes from FPTP as it requires a 
majority of the vote to win.  If no candidate wins a majority of the vote in the first-round within a 
parliamentary constituency election, then a second round would be conducted where the two 
candidates who had the most votes would have a run off.  The implementation of this system 
would not only require more work for electoral institutions (like the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya [ECK] which already seems to be unable to handle its responsibilities [see chapter three 
for an analysis of the ECK]) by having to run two rounds of voting not just one, but it would also 
likely result in more petitions as third place candidates might protest the results for the second 
place position.
32
  This would only serve to slow up the entire electoral process and would likely 
not even address the ethnic component of voting as the run-off would still be along ethnic lines.  
Mixed-Member Proportional representation, based on a single ballot vote, is a more 
inclusive voting system that attempts to make sure representation ends up proportionally 
representing the votes cast instead of it just being based on who has the most votes.  The 
objective of an MMP electoral system is “to rectify imbalances in electoral outcomes produced by 
constituency elections through the simultaneous holding of a separate PR list election, whereby 
political parties put up slates of nominated candidates, a proportionate number of these candidates 
being elected according to the number of votes cast for the different parties.”33  The principle 
behind the MMP is that the overall total of party members that is elected should mirror the 
proportion of votes received.  In order to compensate for smaller parties that are often under-
represented in parliament, extra seats would be given to these parties based on their proportional 
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representation of the vote.
34
  The party with the largest number of candidates elected directly 
from constituencies will not gain further seats in parliament from the PR list.
35
  Essentially the 
additional party seats in parliament compensate opposition parties, “topping up” local results.36  
The single-vote system would mean that a voter‟s vote for a candidate in constituency elections 
would also count as his/her party vote for the PR reckoning.
37
    
The final recommendation by the Kriegler Commission was the closed list PR at both 
provincial and national levels, where voters vote for a political party from a list of candidates 
provided by the party.
38
  The principle justification for using the closed list PR system is that it 
allows minorities representation while at the same time discouraging political mobilization 
centered on ethnicity or race.
39
  The idea is that if there are no numerically dominant ethnic 
groups then the list PR system will diminish incentives for parties to campaign on the grounds of 
ethnicity.
40
  Instead politicians would need to appeal to voters across ethnicities: “by encouraging 
bids by politicians across the spectrum of race, ethnicity, and religion, PR fosters mutual 
accommodation.”41      
 Each of these systems will be furthered scrutinized following the discussion of 
presidential electoral reform options. 
 
Presidential Electoral Reform Options 
 Kenyan current electoral rules designate three requirements in order to be elected 
president: (1) a candidate must win in a nation-wide count, (2) secure at least 25% of the vote in 
                                                             
34 Southall, 451. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 452.  In an open list PR voters would be able to list party candidates in order of preference.  This 
could perhaps be an option down the road if the closed list PR proved to be a relatively effective way of 
decreasing the salience of ethnicity in elections. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
31 
 
five of the eight provinces, and (3) must win the parliamentary seat in their own constituency.
42
  
The FPTP system of voting for president has clearly proven to be ineffective at representing the 
interests of the people and its flaws were demonstrated by the violence that ensued after the 
release of the rather dubious election results.  A president elected by minority vote does not 
represent who the people want. 
The Kriegler Commission suggested the use of a two-round presidential election, with the 
second round consisting of the two candidates with the most votes.  The goal of this system is to 
eliminate the possibility of a candidate becoming president with a minority vote.  If this system 
had been used in the 2007 elections, using the ECK‟s questionable data, Kibaki and Odinga 
would have moved on to the second round (with 46.4% and 44.1% of the votes respectively).
43
  
Then people would have had to vote between these two candidates, the winner being the 
candidate to receive the majority of the vote (over 50%).  A second recommendation that was 
briefly alluded to is returning to the pre-1992 elections where presidents were elected directly by 
parliament.
44
  In theory this would mean that the president would be dependent on the majority in 
parliament.  The reform options for the presidency are obviously less extensive than the many 
electoral options for parliament.  This is rather disconcerting as many claim it is the overly 
powerful office of the presidency that has played a role in the escalating ethnic tensions in Kenya.     
 
Section D- Recommendations 
Each of these electoral systems has positives and negatives, experiencing successes and 
failures in other African countries with multi-ethnic backgrounds.  The recommendations that 
follow utilize experiences from other African countries and apply their ideas to Kenya‟s unique 
situation, the foremost concern being to implement a system that decreases the salience of 
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ethnicity in elections.  With Kenya‟s current limitations, the voting system needs to be changed to 
a closed list PR system in parliamentary elections and to a two-round system in presidential 
elections.   
 
Parliamentary Electoral Reform Recommendation 
Reform is more easily accepted in society when the change is relatively small.  This 
explains the appeal of keeping the FPTP voting system and simply changing constituency 
boundaries in an attempt to decrease the ethnic factors that currently inhibit the FPTP system.  
Unfortunately, a small change will not suffice to make the impact needed to de-emphasize 
ethnicity in voting.  The trust that would need to be placed in the hands of the institute creating 
new constituency boundaries to support the FPTP system is absent in Kenyan society.  After all 
of the questions surrounding the 2007 elections and the role of ECK, trust in electoral systems 
and those in charge of them is greatly lacking.  The delimitation of borders would be further 
complicated especially in rural areas as ethnic groups are largely divided regionally.  Thus, a 
voting system based on boundaries would not eliminate the use of ethnic coalitions in order to 
gain power.  Changing constituencies would have little impact on addressing the ethnic issues 
that FPTP already fails to deal with and perpetuates.  
 The two-round system, while achievable for presidential elections (see Presidential 
Electoral Reform below), creates even more work for a system that already consists of 210 
constituencies.  Only if the number of constituencies was decreased would this become a viable 
option.   
MMP representation was initially successful in Lesotho following its implementation for 
the 2002 elections.  Although it took help from the South African government to negotiate the use 
of MMP, the result was that while the Lesotho Congress of Democracy (LCD) won all but one of 
the 79 constituencies with only 57.7% of the vote, the allocation of extra seats based on the 
33 
 
system of national list representation allowed opposition parties to gain representation in 
parliament.
45
  Voters did not appear to have difficulty voting for both individual party candidates 
in constituency elections and then for parties in the PR ballot;
46
 however, Lesotho ran into 
problems in its 2007 elections.  Based on the election results, LCD was the winning party so it did 
not receive seats under the PR poll.   However, the LCD made an alliance with an opposition 
party, allowing it to essentially secure seats under the PR poll, undermining the intention of 
MMP.
47
 The single-vote system suggested by the Kriegler Commission would help avoid such a 
situation from occurring in Kenya.  While this system was relatively successful in Lesotho, MMP 
does come with its own set of problems.  First of all, MMPs still require equitable constituency 
boundaries which have proven to be a challenge for both reasons of trust and implementation.  
Parliament would also need to be expanded (a financially costly option) or the number of 
constituencies would need to be reduced (which could lead to protests from ethnic groups worried 
about losing an advantage).
48
  Another concern would be the treatment of PR Members of 
Parliament (MPs) as second class citizens as was exemplified in Lesotho.
49
  Perhaps more 
importantly, “if constituencies continued in essence to represent voters according to ethnicity, as 
is likely, then the capacity of MMP to diminish the political salience of ethnicity would be 
limited.”50  Thus, MMP still does not take away the ethnic component of voting, but it is at least a 
step in the right direction, allowing for more diverse representation in parliament.           
 The closed list PR system is the best solution for Kenya at this point in time.  It achieved 
relative success in post-apartheid South Africa.  The system was implemented in South Africa 
just prior to the 1994 elections.  Like most countries‟ experience with list PRs, one of the 
negative aspects is that power becomes greatly concentrated in the hands of parties and party 
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leaders, taking power away from the people.
51
  The party bosses then have the power to control 
not only placement of individuals on party lists (which could be based on ethnicity), but they 
could also expel people from the party to keep them out of parliament.
52
  This would mean that 
individual MPs would be held responsible to the party above constituents which would be 
positive if parties represented a large group of constituents, but since parties also tend to run 
along ethnic lines, this system would allow for the continuation of party politics based on ethnic 
groups.  It could also promote the explosion of even more political parties resulting in each ethnic 
group having its own party.  The incentive to form small parties as a result of a proportional 
representation system can be seen in the case of Israel.
53
  Under the current system, political 
parties and ethnic groups are forced into alliances and coalitions when elections approach.  The 
suggestion for Kenya is that since it has familiarity with constituencies, its adoption of the list PR 
system operating in its eight provinces would ensure that the individual members of 
constituencies retained a degree of accountability to their region.
54
  If Kenya were to use a PR 
system with these eight provinces as constituencies, the ethnic factors would be greatly reduced: 
“the fact that the provincial constituencies would be relatively large and multi-ethnic would mean 
that candidates would be hard pressed to restrict their appeal to a narrow set of particular ethnic 
groups.”55  Additionally, demarcation by province would help create an electoral framework for 
second-tier provincial assemblies if a Majimbo system of government was implemented in the 
future.
56
  To date the ECK, whose responsibility it is to define constituency boundaries, has 
largely not performed the role.  It blames the unwillingness on Parliament to increase the number 
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of constituencies.
57
  However, with 210 constituencies already, more constituencies would simply 
increase the amount of work for the ECK in elections.  The appropriate number of constituencies 
that should be redrawn needs more research and evaluation, but as constituencies have often been 
the source of ethnic divisions, it is crucial that the number of constituencies decrease so they 
become more ethnically diverse.  There is always the concern of scare tactics being used by larger 
ethnic groups within constituencies against smaller groups in order to get the votes they desire, 
but the PR system would at least give smaller groups within the provinces some representation.  
The PR system would essentially make up for having larger districts.  It is critical, however, that 
constituencies do not become too large, as it is these constituencies and the MPs who represent 
them that know the needs of the local communities within them.   
The closed PR system would also allow for the elimination of the 12 MPs the president 
can currently nominate after an election.  Historically these nominations have been handpicked by 
the president for his own benefit instead of these 12 members being nominated by the political 
parties based on a proportionate representation in parliament.
58
  While it would be beneficial to 
use these seats to increase the representation of women, small ethnic groups, and other special 
interests such as the disabled, the likelihood of corruption makes this too risky and likely 
unbeneficial to the parties it is supposed to help.
59
  A lesson to be learned from South Africa‟s 
experience with list PR is not to allow floor-crossing/party defections once MPs have been 
elected.  This practice distorted the proportionality that had been conveyed by voters, then 
distorted public financing for parties, and also disrupted the internal functioning of political 
parties.
60
  Kenya‟s history with politicians switching allegiance (refer to Chapter 2 on political 
parties and coalitions) would make floor-crossing a very likely, and disagreeable, outcome.  The 
closed list PR system is a place for Kenyan parliamentary electoral reform to begin.  Its 
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explanation to the public as a way to encompass all party interests will be critical in the success of 
its acceptance and implementation into the Kenyan electoral system.   
 
Presidential Electoral Reform Recommendation 
Electoral reform for the office of president is extremely important in Kenya.  One of the 
major benefits of having a two round presidential election is the pressure it would take off the 
incumbent to proclaim a “dubious victory.”61  This would increase the legitimacy of the president 
and at the same time defuse the pressures for the incumbent to act unconstitutionally in order to 
maintain power.
62
  The days of presidents being elected directly by parliament are over.  Now that 
voting for the president has become an institutionalized feature for the public to interact in 
choosing their leader, it would be difficult to take that power away.  It would be increasingly 
difficult to give the power back to parliament as the lack of legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the 
people would greatly hinder any confidence in the president parliament chose.   
Therefore, it is essential the Kenyan state seek presidential electoral reform in the guise 
of a two-round system.  If anything this will prevent a minority vote from inaugurating a 
president, thus not representing the will of the people.  While this reform will not change the 
amount of power currently residing with the president (this will need to be addressed in many 
different sectors of Kenyan society), it would guarantee that the president was ultimately desired 
by a majority.   
 In its report, the IREC determined that simplicity was of the essence.  As other multi-
ethnic countries in Africa have struggled to find an electoral voting system that works within the 
cultural confines of ethnically diverse societies, reform of the parliamentary and presidential 
platforms will only address a piece of the political process that has instigated ethnicity as a 
weapon for success.
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Chapter 2- 
Political Parties and Campaigning 
 
 
“Political party leaders in Kenya are their own worst enemies, the parties 
are seen as an end in themselves rather than a means to an end” 
-IREC 
 
 
Most people would assume that an increase in public participation in elections is a 
sign of positive involvement; however, public participation can also be the very source 
that incites the problem: “Divisive tribal sentiments propagated by political parties and 
their supporters were spread and relayed to the public by the media.  Civil society was 
accused of partiality; the faiths abandoned the true message, instead leading their flocks 
to their respective ethnic nests.  Observers to some extent assumed the role of 
participants, with regrettable consequences.”1  Political parties in Kenya have certainly 
embraced ethnic division as a way to gain political support and power and have spread 
their messages through campaigning during elections, infecting all areas of society.  The 
structure of political parties and the style of campaigning within the present electoral 
system only create winners who win everything or losers who lose everything in the eyes 
of both politicians and constituents.  If the current practices of political parties are not 
modified, especially those during election campaigning, then ethnicity will continue to 
dominate Kenya‟s political scene resulting in ethnic violence that has the potential to lead 
to ethnic cleansing.   The rules for political parties need to be redefined and better 
mechanisms created for developing and enforcing these rules need to be established. 
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Three types of political parties prevail in Kenyan politics: the mono-ethnic party, 
the multi-ethnic alliance type, and the multi-ethnic integrative type.
2
  The use of 
coalitions in Kenyan politics has dominated the political scene, especially in the periods 
surrounding elections, largely as a result of the demographic reality that Kenya is made 
up of 42 ethnic groups, resulting in a prevalence of ethnic minority groups.  This makes 
for a different political need to garner support during elections than say in countries like 
Rwanda and Burundi which are ethnic bifurcations.
3
  The seven dominant ethnic groups 
in Kenya are: the Kikuyu in Central and Eastern provinces (22%), the Luhya in the 
Western province (14%), Luo in Nyanza Province (13%), the Kalenjin in central and 
northern areas of the Rift Valley (12%), the Kamba in the Eastern Province (11%), the 
Kissi in Nyanza (6%), and the Meru in the Eastern Province (6%).
4
  These ethnic groups 
often form ethnic conglomerations from sub-groups or neighboring ethnic cousins as 
elections spur the need for coalitions.  For example, the Luhya group is comprised of 18 
sub-tribes.
5
 With these ethnic groups promoting their own interests, it is no wonder that 
in the current system of democratization Kenya‟s political parties have grown from ten in 
1992 to 160 by the end of 2008.
6
  With this background, political parties in Kenya come 
to rely on ethnicity in elections: “Manipulation of mass ethnic feelings is often the surest 
instrument of electoral success, democratic participation (in elections) serves to fan 
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ethnic conflict at the mass level as well.”7  This manipulation of ethnicity for political 
success began long before modern day elections in Kenya.  
 
Section A- Independence and Post-Colonialism 
Political parties and campaigning have their roots in Kenya‟s colonial past.  The 
constructions of colonial rule and governance greatly shaped how these structures 
function in modern Kenyan society. 
 
Parties for Independence 
“It is the institution of colonialism that created a common centre that all the 
existing ethnic groups in given colonial states are at once required to relate to.  The 
emerging relations soon became relations of competition over access to goods and 
services associated with modernity.”8  The backdrop to ethnic political parties and 
campaigning in elections was set during the colonial era with the establishment of the 
colonial settler economy in Kenya.  Land appropriation and alienation through colonial 
law, such as the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, enabled white settlers to occupy the 
best land that could be of permanent use.
9
  This system bifurcated land into two arenas: 
land for Africans entitled “native reserves” and land for European settlement (the White 
Highlands) or “scheduled land.”10  The resulting dual system of land administration and 
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political governance not only took away land rights of Africans
11
, but through the use of 
taxation forced many Africans to migrate to the white highlands for wage labor on settler 
farms.
12
  This put many ethnic groups in competition for the first time as previously 
groups had been settled throughout Kenya.  Ethnic groups were not only now interacting 
in a closer vicinity to each other, but were given land units reserved specifically for each 
ethnic group, laying the foundation for ethnic antagonism as land quality on the reserves 
varied greatly.
13
  Society was to be divided: “These native reserves laid a firm framework 
for solidifying ethnicisation of Kenyan society.  The administration placed solid 
sociopolitical boundaries between the various units of the native reserves and by doing so 
obstructed „political‟ interactions among the native reserves, and thus prevented inter-
ethnic political relationships.”14   Instead of allowing the different ethnic groups to live 
and work together, colonial structures purposefully instigated divisions in order to 
maintain colonial rule.  Finally, beginning in the 1940s, a group of Kenyans 
(predominately Kikuyu), which the British named the Mau Mau, began to rebel against 
the colonial government.
15
  Their rebellion eventually led the British to declare a state of 
emergency in Kenya that lasted from 1952 until 1959.  The irony of this period of 
struggle is that instead of addressing the colonial injustices regarding land, the 
reallocation of land in the late colonial and post-colonial period actually increased 
unequal patterns of land access and ownership across class and ethnic lines.
16
  This was 
largely a consequence of Kikuyu dominance in rebellion against the British resulting in a 
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sense of entitlement.  Therefore, the political parties that were formed after the state of 
emergency ended, KANU and KADU (see Chapter 1 for a previous discussion), were 
both formed on the basis of ethnic groups.
17
    
   The tensions between ethnic groups that were exacerbated during the colonial 
period as a result of land distribution help explain why political parties and campaigning 
still center on the ethnic unit.  Afraid of being dealt a bad hand again, members of each 
ethnic group want to make sure they are getting the best resources they can and that 
another group is not receiving an unfair advantage.  Because politicians and constituents 
have become driven by clientism with a winner-take-all view regarding political power 
and its associated economic byproducts, political parties have become completely reliant 
on the ethnic factor in order to gain easy support to win the all or nothing elections
18
:  
“The objective is therefore to secure control of the state in order „to eat,‟ and to ensure 
that a co-(or allied) ethnic becomes president, this requiring the formation of alliances 
and cross-ethnic coalitions.  Politicians thus obtain power by using ethnic arithmetic and 
clientage as mobilizing factors, the issue simply being how to win power in order to 
access state resources.”19  The result has been political and ethnic struggle for control 
over the state dominated by the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Kalenjin groups who occupy 
the best agricultural land.
20
  The winning coalition in both parliamentary and presidential 
elections has thus far been the one that was able to win support of the majority from the 
four groups.
21
  As a consequence of these four dominant groups, the other 38 ethnic 
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groups in Kenya have been drawn to ethnic conglomerations and coalitions especially 
during elections in order to make sure their interests are protected.
22
  However, this 
fixation with crafting coalitions does not end once the election is over: “Once in power, 
the success and failure of the incumbent president, indeed the legitimacy and stability of 
their governments, have largely been measured against their ability to cultivate and 
maintain the support of a broad, multi-ethnic coalition of the four major groups.”23  It is 
this constant scramble for support that plays into political parties drawing on the easiest 
and most convenient means of support, ethnic groups.    
 
The Emergence of Political Coalitions 
Despite the emergence of political parties in the struggle for independence, the 
period between 1969-1991 stands out as all five of the general elections held during this 
period (1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988) were one party only elections, that of KANU.
24
  
The events of the 1988 election with electoral fraud and resignations led to the birth of an 
opposition alliance comprised of „young‟ professionals and intellectuals hoping to 
mobilize the population for change.
25
  The pressure of foreign donors who decided to 
withhold financial aid until Kenya implemented political reform also helped develop the 
opposition.
26
  These pressures piloted the KANU government to change the Constitution 
of Kenyan ending one party rule in time for the 1992 elections.  Yet despite this change, 
President Moi and his political party KANU won electoral victories in the 1992 and 1997 
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elections.  It was finally after the 1997 elections when Moi only won by 40% of the vote, 
that the opposition politicians realized the only way power would change hands would be 
through alliances.
27
    
The emergence of the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC), an alliance 
made up of other political groups including Mwai Kibaki‟s National Alliance Party of 
Kenya (NAK) and Raila Odinga‟s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP- made up of ex-
KANU), finally pushed KANU out of power.  With Mwai Kibaki winning 62% to Uhuru 
Kenyatta‟s 31% (he was Moi‟s handpicked candidate), the December 27, 2002 
presidential elections were the first time since colonial independence that a ruling party 
was defeated and conceded power.
28
  However, once in power, the coalition members of 
NARC began to fragment, the final push resulting during the November 21, 2005 
constitutional referendum when LDP members returned to an alliance with KANU, 
forming the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), to get the draft constitution rejected 
by voters.
29
  After more political realignment during the 2005-2007 interregnum in which 
the ODM unraveled creating two parties, the Orange Democratic Movement Party of 
Kenya led by Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) led 
by Kalonzo Musyoka.
30
  Uhuru Kenyatta‟s KANU faction joined with the Party of 
National Unity (PNU).
31
  This political shifting would lead to the 2007 election, pitting 
Raila Odinga of ODM versus Kibaki of PNU (with Musyoka‟s ODM-K never becoming 
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a major factor).  To see a breakdown of multi-ethnic party coalitions from 1963-2007 see 
Table 1 in Appendix IV.
32
   
Party sponsorship is a pre-requisite in presidential, parliamentary, and civic 
elections meaning that independent candidates are not recognized.  As such, political 
parties are the only vehicle for political representation.
33
  These political alliances have 
created an environment of political parties that lack any sort of permanent party structure 
or membership.
34
  As such, their ability to hold primaries, follow electoral rules and 
regulations, and garner support based on factors other than ethnicity are very limited.  By 
their very nature, political parties in Kenya breed ethnicity.  
 
Institutionalized Fear and Ethnicity 
Violence following an election was not a new phenomenon of the 2007 elections.  
In both 1992 and 1997 politicians used “local resentments against exclusion from land, 
water rights, employment opportunities and access to other resources to provoke violence 
against outsiders, not least because the presence of the latter within their constituencies 
presented a numerical threat to their winning the forthcoming election.”35  These 
politicians used real issues but put an ethnic spin on them to garner support.  Under 
President Moi‟s twenty-four year reign, the use of ethnicity as a political tool became a 
staple of retaining power. Largely characterized by institutionalized fear, political 
opposition had little chance of formation against the powerful KANU, as Moi instigated 
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state violence and intimidation to pressure people into doing his bidding.
36
  He was even 
able to change the Constitution, officially establishing Kenya as a de jure single-party 
state.  When opposition parties did finally form, he was still able to win as a result of 
divided opposition.  While both sides used political killings in order to intimidate the 
public into voting a certain way, it was Moi‟s exploitation of ethnic tensions that set a 
standard for the future.  He played on the ever increasing fear of smaller ethnic groups 
that they would be dominated by larger ethnic groups.  The use of ethnicity, specifically 
the violence used against certain ethnic groups during Moi‟s presidency, set a dangerous 
precedent for the acceptability and role of forms of ethnic cleansing in political 
competitions.  
The post-independence construction of ethnically based patronage politics 
centered around single-member electoral constituencies, the centralization of power 
around the president, and the growth of armed militias associated with politicians and 
political groups have all aided in the ethnic component of elections.
37
  The predisposing 
conditions of successive governments in Kenya‟s history ethnicizing political conflict 
have perpetuated governments and politicians in continuing the pattern of brandishing 
ethnicity as a political weapon whenever the votes may be close.  
 
Section B- Kenya Against the Kikuyu 
Ethnic Campaigning 
Ethnicity reared its ugly head in the 2007 elections much like it had in the past.  
Odinga and Kibaki each drew specific ethnic constituencies to their respective parties.  
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Kibaki‟s support stemmed from the Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru communities of Central 
and central Eastern provinces.
38
  Odinga drew support from the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin, 
and some of the smaller ethnic communities.
39
  Despite both parties being composed of 
multiple ethnic groups, the Kriegler Report classified the PNU and the ODM in different 
terms: “The PNU, though registered as a political party under Kenyan law as it then was, 
was in reality an electoral alliance.”40  The ODM on the other hand, though relatively 
new, was a full-fledged political party and as such was more cohesively organized, 
lending to less competition within the party allowing for a single candidate in each of the 
provincial and civic contests.
41
  Despite these differences in the principles that brought 
the ethnic groups together under one banner, each party heavily relied on ethnicity to gain 
prominence and garner more support.  While the campaign platforms of the two 
presidential candidates did not directly promote any sort of ethnic favoritism, ethnicity 
was the underlying factor in the stance each party took.  Outwardly, Kibaki‟s campaign 
focused on his past rather successful socio-economic record.  Odinga in turn focused on 
the idea of change especially in regards to fundamental political and socio-economic 
reform as well as the devolution of state power.
42
  The underlying conditions of Kenya‟s 
society revealed something deeper: “The 2007 election took place against the background 
of a meteoric growth in the Kenyan population, deepening poverty, widening inequality 
and youth under-employment.”43  These were the issues the two political parties had to 
work with.  One of Odinga‟s major platforms was majimbo upon which he believed 
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would help reduce power of the executive, give greater political and fiscal authority 
locally, and place economic development and responsibilities directly in local 
communities.
44
  Kibaki used this against Odinga claiming that majimbo was simply a 
strategy to divide Kenya along ethno-regional lines.  By focusing on the ethnic factor 
instead of addressing the issues raised by Odinga, Kibaki diverted the focus from the real 
issues at hand.  Instead of focusing on these issues as a national problem, they both made 
them an ethnic problem: “Confronted with acute poverty, inequalities and unemployment 
in the context of ethnic polarization and the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, Kenya‟s 
fragmented ethnic elite resorted to populism and manipulation of genuine economic 
grievances and disaffection to win the vote of the poor.”45   
Rhetoric played a crucial role during the campaign in appealing to the poor.  
Slogans are often what determine who the poor or uneducated will support in elections 
and are a key tool in piecing different groups together under a common banner.  To 
promote this “unity” among different ethnic groups, the ODM used the slogans “41 
against 1” and “Kenya against the Kikuyu” throughout the period leading up to the 2007 
election.
46
  ODM campaigning focused on Kikuyu domination in the government and in 
the economy (including banking and trade), portraying a picture of Kikuyu success as a 
result of marginalizing other ethnic groups.
47
  Such campaigning, especially the blatant 
use of directed slogans, helped construct a political conscience against the Kikuyu.  The 
negative connotation increased the already present hostilities between the ethnic groups.  
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Such slogans gave the people an enemy on which to target their aggression when the 
election did not go as they wanted: “resurgence of ethnic nationalism which underpinned 
the campaign and voting during the elections and prepared the ground for the post-
election violence.”48  Hate speech was a prominent feature of campaigning; however, 
“Typical in Kenyan campaigns, both sides charged the other with using tribal appeals 
while boasting of their own multi-ethnic credentials.”49  All three leading presidential 
candidates (Kibaki, Odinga, and Musyoka) tried to establish their credibility as multi-
ethnic by running with a vice-presidential candidate from the Luhya community.
50
 
The result of hate speech in the election was not just to rally members of a 
political party around a common goal (keeping/getting power out of Kikuyu hands), but 
was also a means of threatening people who lived outside their “indigenous” provinces.51  
Many of these people were threatened with eviction, in hopes of them moving, thus 
making it easier to win the constituency.  What furthered perpetuated hate speech in this 
election was that the media took no steps to curb its use.  A large result of this probably 
stems from the fact that many of the FM stations were owned by politicians or received 
funding, or bribes from them.
52
  Silent endorsement by the media to certain parties and 
candidates was a common occurrence.
53
  The increasing accessibility of information and 
broadcasting meant ethnic hate speech could reach deeper into society than it ever had 
before.  It also meant that uncensored media at the local level could say and do what it 
pleased: “Vernacular radio stations‟ coverage demonstrated a tendency to grant greater 
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access to the parties and candidates with close links to the tribal and political affiliations 
of their listeners.”54  This was exacerbated by new sources of information such as blogs 
that were intensely tribal and incited negative ethnic feelings.
55
  The ethnic rhetoric used 
throughout the campaigning process brought ethnicity to the forefront of the public‟s 
minds in regards to the upcoming election. 
With ethnicity already dictating much of the campaigns, unsavory practices by 
political parties including vote buying and selling using public resources, ballot stuffing, 
and the use of intimidation and violence against political opposition, increasing an 
already tense situation.
56
   As ethnic disputes and grievances over land and citizenship 
became key issues during the campaign, escalating tensions that had been building since 
colonial times finally exploded into the post-election violence and displacement.
57
  A 
prominent feature of both ODM parliamentary and presidential campaigns was the 
emphasis that only vote rigging would prevent ODM from taking power in the elections 
(based on success during the 2005 referendum).
58
  This type of political strategy during 
the campaign contributed to the violence after the election since the ODM‟s predictions 
come true.  The media/information blackout that followed after the announcement of the 
presidential results accelerated the rash actions of the Kenyan public.
59
  All the ethnic 
campaigning of the elections finally was acted upon as ethnic groups attacked each other, 
not knowing where else to place the blame.  
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Code of Conduct: 
Most of the political campaigning that occurred during the 2007 elections was in 
blatant disregard of the Electoral Commission of Kenya‟s (ECK) code of conduct.60  This 
code of conduct had been derived from the Code of Conduct for Political Parties 
Campaigning in Democratic Elections, published by the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
61
  Its basic tenants for political party behavior 
during elections include
62
: 
 Recognize the right and freedom of all other parties to campaign, and to 
disseminate their political ideas and principles without fear 
 Use its good offices to ensure reasonable freedom of access to all potential voters 
 Ensure that none of its supporters are permitted to do anything that is prohibited 
 Organize and conduct its election campaign in a congenial and peaceful 
atmosphere 
 Avoid using language that is inflammatory or threatens or incites violence 
 
In addition the political parties violated internationally recognized norms regulating the 
polling and counting processes along with the abuse of state resources for political 
advantage
63
: 
 Co-operate with election officials to ensure peaceful and orderly polling, and 
freedom of voters to exercise their franchise 
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 Not procure votes by forcible occupation of polling stations or through illegal 
activities in polling stations 
 Ensure the safety and security of electoral officials before, during and after the 
polls, and not interfere unjustifiably or in bad faith with the duties of election 
officials. 
 Respect and co-operate with official or accredited election observers 
 Maintain and aid in maintaining the secrecy of the vote 
 Accept the outcome of an election  that has been certified 
 In the event of grievance, submit any grievance only to the relevant dispute 
settlement agency 
 Accept and comply with the final decisions of the dispute settlement agency 
 Not abuse a position of power, privilege or influence for political purpose by 
offering a reward, threatening a penalty or harm by any other means 
 Not use official state, provincial, municipal, or other public resources for 
campaign purposes 
 Not coerce or offer monetary or other kinds of inducements to persons to stand or 
not stand as candidates 
 
Political parties chose not to follow these rules/guidelines as the ECK did little to enforce 
them.  As such, political parties essentially had free rein to do and say what they pleased 
despite the negative consequences to Kenyan society. 
 
 
52 
 
Section C- Reform Options 
Political parties are supposed to be the link between citizens and the political 
elites.
64
  As a link, they are supposed to provide voters with the best sources of 
information and to ultimately promote the common good.  However, this has largely not 
been the case in Africa where political parties have become “elite enterprises and 
vehicles of competition and control over the masses.”65  Political parties have simply 
become the means for attaining power.  The constant volatility of political alliances and 
coalitions means that political parties in Kenya are far from stable institutions and as 
such, their motivations are centered on obtaining political authority.
66
  This instability 
means that it is hard for people to ever truly connect with a political party: “This fluidity 
and high incidence of turnover may present well-known obstacles to voters gathering 
information on relevant issues or personalities, and inhibit parties‟ incentives to cultivate 
longer-lasting relationships with citizens, aggregate interests, and train new generations 
of leaders.”67  As such, their manipulation of ethnicity during elections is nothing more 
than a tool to garner support in order to achieve control.  The consequences of these 
actions are great.  As one of the primary conduits of ethnic tensions, political parties and 
especially their use of campaigning need to be reformed if the ethnic violence that 
resulted from the 2007 elections is to be stopped from occurring after future elections.     
The Political Parties Act (PPA) was created in an attempt to address some of the 
major problems that were made apparent during the 2007 election process.  It officially 
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became operational on 1 July 2008.  Under the Act, a party can be denied registration if 
its membership is restricted to or only includes: “members of a particular ethnic, age, 
tribal, racial, gender, regional, linguistic, corporatist, professional or religious group or if 
the proposed party‟s structure or mode of operation is not national.”68  This is designed to 
not only decrease the number of political parties in Kenya, but to prohibit parties based 
solely on ethnicity.  The Act also addresses funding issues ensuring that a political 
party‟s assets and funds are documented.69  This will help with the corruption component 
of money being spent on bribes for vote-buying or selling.  In turn, the Act establishes a 
Political Parties Fund that designates who gets money and how it can be used.  15% of 
the Fund is distributed equally among all political parties, while 85% is allotted 
proportionately to the total number of votes secured at the last election by each party‟s 
candidates, and 5% is retained in order to pay for the administration costs of the Fund.
70
  
While this Act is a step in the right direction by trying to establish more equity between 
political parties, it really does not address the underlying manipulation of ethnicity that 
political parties rely on.   
Although ethnicity lies deeper in society than simply political parties, it is their 
actions and rhetoric that increase hostilities especially around elections.  There are two 
key areas where political parties in Kenya need to be monitored closer and reform needs 
to take place in order to stop the promotion of ethnicity as an acceptable political tool: the 
first is the messages that are being sent during the campaigning process, and the second is 
increasing political party respect for the electoral institutions already in place.  
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Inciting Division 
 As seen in the 2007 elections, campaign slogans and rhetoric during speeches 
were central to the message candidates were sending out to the Kenyan people.  The 
ODM, understanding that divided opposition parties in the past had lead to unsuccessful 
campaigns against the incumbent president, pushed the idea of all the ethnic groups 
against the Kikuyu as its only shot at victory: “Politicians thus obtain power by using 
ethnic arithmetic and clientage as mobilizing factors for the purpose of winning power to 
access state resources.”71  This was a relatively easy venture based on the history of 
building dogma about the Kikuyu domination: “Combined with the prominent role of the 
Mount Kenya groups in the commanding heights of the Kenyan economy, the ability of 
the Kikuyu to tap a vote-rich coalition has transformed the group into a perceptual 
majority that has always been a target of fear and counter-mobilization by other 
groups.”72  While changing these perceptions which are deeply rooted in Kenyan society, 
the direct use of hate speech in slogans, speeches, party literature/advertisements, and 
other political party instruments of information and communication can be changed.  The 
role the media plays in the role of hate speech in regards to elections and campaigning is 
also a huge factor as that is how political parties are able to spread their hate messages to 
their constituents.   
One of the major concerns with monitoring the use of hate speech is that it will 
violate not just freedom of speech but freedom of expression.  The question becomes 
when is the freedom of expression less important than promoting public safety?  As such, 
reform options for whom, what, and how to monitor hate speech will be challenging.  
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Three apparent possible monitors of hate speech are: the media, civic institutions such as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the ECK.  Political parties have obviously 
demonstrated their inability to monitor themselves and having them monitor each other 
would only create more hostilities and situations for violence.  As far as what exactly to 
monitor, blatant ethnic hostility is easy to identity such as the slogan “Kenyans versus 
Kikuyu.”  It is the underlying jabs that will be harder to pin point and to say should be 
stopped as the meaning could be construed in many different ways.  Whoever is in charge 
of monitoring political parties‟ use of hate speech will also need to create some sort of 
guidelines as to what is appropriate use of ethnicity versus what can be considered hate 
speech.  The monitoring methodology will also be exceedingly challenging as the 
expansion of media and information into every corner of Kenyan society will make it 
difficult for any institution to supervise and check everything and everywhere.     
 
Institutional Enforcement 
 Having an institution that can monitor the behavior of political parties will be 
critical for any sort of reform to take place.  The ECK is supposed to be the institution 
that monitors electoral matters, but, as the 2007 elections proved, the ECK has not been 
doing a very good job.  While there are many mechanisms in place that allow the ECK to 
pursue many infringements that political parties commit, the ECK has not enforced any 
of these rules.  For example, political parties are known to use a technique called 
“zoning” to keep opposition candidates out of certain areas.73  This violates the Electoral 
Code of Conduct and can be prosecuted by the ECK if it were to bring it to the Attorney-
                                                             
73 Republic of Kenya, 59. 
56 
 
General.  This is only one example of the ethnically motivated political violence that 
occurs during election periods.  The use of intimidation in this manner definitely violates 
the code of conduct; yet, the ECK did nothing.  In order to enforce both the upstanding 
electoral regulations regarding political party behavior and to implement new standards 
on hate speech, there needs to be an institution that will actually follow through.  There 
are a few institutions that this responsibility could fall to: (1) the ECK if it were 
strengthened and given enough authority to hold political parties accountable; (2) an 
NGO that was committed to monitoring political party behavior especially during 
elections; and finally, another government institution.  The key is that whichever 
institution is chosen, it needs to have the respect of the entire Kenyan community if it 
will have any sort of legitimacy.    
 
Section D- Recommendations 
The legitimacy of political parties in the future needs to be dependent on their 
ability to follow the rules set forth that eliminate the focus of ethnicity in elections.  To 
accomplish this, the rules for political parties need to be redefined and better mechanisms 
established for developing and enforcing these rules. The key to reforming the behavior 
of political parties is to change the incentives systems that currently dominate the 
political scene:  
Kenyan political institutions have been subject to the power of a highly 
centralized and personalized presidency; that political parties have been 
driven by the desire of politicians to acquire access to state resources and 
patronage; that these parties have focused overwhelmingly upon the 
necessity of winning; and that, as a result, elections in Kenya have become 
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a „do or die‟ zero-sum exercise in which politicians have resorted both to 
appeals to ethnicity and the use of violence against opponents.
74
   
 
Changing political incentives has been a challenging venture as they are extremely 
entrenched in Kenyan society.  It would be ideal for political parties to have some sort of 
internal monitoring system: “Parties are meant to have robust internal debate and strong 
internal structures.”75  Because this is not practical in a system that breaks the rules that 
are in place, it is left to an outside institution to monitor political party behavior to 
eliminate the negative use of ethnicity. 
 
Inciting Division 
 “Sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never hurt me.”  
Unfortunately, this saying does not apply to the verbal bashing of ethnic groups during 
elections.  Every time a politician, a political ad, or media group uses hate speech, ethnic 
hostilities become more ingrained into society.  The use of hate speech at party rallies via 
text messages, emails, posters, and leaflets, all become “vehicles of excitement” that 
often lead to ethnic violence.
76
  With the increased role of the media and technology in 
the 2007 elections for both direct campaigning and the release of information to the 
public, it will be important for the mechanisms provided by Kenya‟s constitution and 
legal framework to be utilized.  The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) Act is 
crucial to the campaigning process as it covers the public medium of communication.
77
  
Part of this act is to ensure there is a fair allocation of broadcasting hours between 
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different political views.
78
  In consultation with the ECK, free air time will be allotted to 
all registered political parties in the election.
79
  These will be a key issues to monitor as 
state run media tends to side with the incumbent or political party currently in power.  
But more than that, this Act should include a clause that prohibits these major media 
corporations from using hate speech or allowing political candidates to use hate speech 
while on their programs or quotes in their publications.  This is one aspect of who will 
and how to monitor hate speech.  In order to take some of the burden off the ECK to 
monitor all of the media, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) needs to be the institution 
to oversee and enforce the media code of conduct that is relevant during elections.
80
  
Members of the media itself as well as people providing interviews or speeches on 
television or through printed media need to be held to a standard that excludes the use of 
rhetoric or actions that in anyway degrade or place blame on another ethnic group that 
will incite undue resentment or hostility.
81
   
There also needs to be punishment for a political party candidate who uses hate 
speech.  While the MCK could provoke airtime or instigate a ban of the party for a period 
of time, this runs the risk of corruption as parties could pay off the MCK for this not to 
happen.  If the ECK, however, was to enforce such punishment, it would have more 
lasting authority.  While the MCK should help with monitoring, the ECK should be the 
institution imposing punishment.  This will be discussed more in the next chapter.   In the 
future civic institutions should also play a role and have monitoring responsibilities.  
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Presently, it might be too risky to have NGOs acting as “watchdogs” for the ECK as they 
will likely have their own political and ethnic biases, but over time, as ethnicity becomes 
less of a divisive factor civic institutions could not only take some of the burden off the 
ECK, but would also be able to go deeper into society, looking at local media, blogs, and 
other such items that might be difficult for the ECK to fully monitor.  Hate speech needs 
to be outlawed as a political campaign tool, much like other forms of ethnic violence 
have been banned. 
 
Institutional Enforcement 
On top of initiating an anti-hate speech section into the KBC Act and into the 
Electoral Code of Conduct, the ECK needs to be given greater capacity to deal with 
blatant disregard for the electoral acts that have already established inappropriate political 
party actions.  Because the EKC is already an established organization that the public and 
political parties have worked with, it will be easier to begin work with the ECK than to 
start a brand new government institution or NGO.  While the task will be challenging as 
both the Kenyan public and political parties have little respect for the ECK, it would be 
hard with any organization meant to harness in ethnic hate as: “The culture of impunity 
maintained by all political players would certainly strain any law-enforcement 
mechanisms that are established.”82  The mechanisms are already in place for the ECK to 
take charge of elections, it just needs to have more authority and aptitude to do so.  For 
example, there are already rules against campaigning at polling centers.  Increased 
training for ECK members at different constituency polling centers can help prepare these 
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workers for how to deal with political intimidation against certain ethnic groups and how 
to manage and eliminate bribery for votes from occurring.  By focusing on rules that are 
already present, the ECK will just be enforcing what it legally has the right to do.  These 
small steps at polling centers can help end the use of violence and pressure by political 
parties to influence the vote.  Institutional enforcement of the rules and an application of 
punishment is the only way that political parties will learn to modify their negative 
behaviors.         
 
Changing the Incentives System: Common Interests 
The ultimate objective of intervening in practices of hate speech and aggression 
against ethnic groups by political parties during elections is more than stopping the 
violence, but to change the focus of elections from ethnic group interests to national 
interests: “The danger of violence diminishes when politicians stress the common 
interests shared by „insiders‟ and „outsiders.‟ ”83  Political parties are currently the main 
instigators of the ideology of an „other‟ or „outsider‟ in Kenyan society.   The ultimate 
goal is for political parties to work together to end the cycle of ethnic violence that began 
during colonial rule.  But until such a time occurs and when corruption is not a 
dominating factor, political parties need to be monitored and penalized for inciting ethnic 
violence and hostilities.  Part of this process is changing the attitude of the public towards 
political parties and what they expect from politicians.  Easy to say but hard to 
implement, the people of Kenya need a model to guide the behavior of political actors. 
The ECK, though in need of reform itself can prove to be a strong mechanism for 
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instituting change within political parties in order to curb the use of ethnicity in 
campaigning and other electoral processes of candidates.  The final chapter addresses the 
ECK and provides ways in which ECK reform will overflow into useful mechanisms to 
help reform political parties, forcing them to shift focus from ethnic interest to civic 
interests if they want political support.
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Chapter 3- 
The Electoral Commission of Kenya 
 
“While elections in Africa are hard to live with, it would be much worse to 
live without them.”1  
-Emmanuel K. 
 
 
While Kenya may have been perceived as a “stable” country in Africa before the 
2007 elections, the events that occurred after the elections transformed the world‟s 
perception of Kenya: “The country highlights the ever-present risk of election disputes 
degenerating into deadly conflicts in the context of weak institutions, elite fragmentation, 
surging ethnic nationalism, authoritarian undertows, corruption, widening social 
economic inequalities, historically embedded injustices, grinding poverty, debt overhang 
and the spillover effects of climate change and global recession.”2  The question becomes 
how to address these issues?  The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) is the most 
logical institution to be held responsible for addressing the issues that caused so much 
destruction in the aftermath of the 2007 elections.  The ECK has been assigned a role in 
almost every aspect of the electoral process.  It has already formed many committees 
designated for different aspects of elections including public education and outreach and 
administration of political parties.  These and other committees can play a large role in 
addressing ethnic issues that stem from these sources.  The current voting system and the 
ways in which political parties are allowed to function have already been shown to be in 
need of reform.  The ECK will only be an effective institution if it establishes 
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institutional independence from the government, imposes its legal duties, and finds a 
better way to resolve election disputes.  Although the ECK is currently defunct since it 
was disbanded by the parliament in 2008 and replaced with the Interim Independent 
Electoral Commission of Kenya, it will need to be re-instituted after reform has been 
agreed upon if the Kenyan electoral system has any chance of recovering its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Kenyan people. 
 
Section A- ECK and the Constitution 
 As of the 2007 elections, the ECK was comprised of a chairman and 21 members, 
the maximum allowed by the Constitution.  The functions granted to the ECK set out in 
Sections 42 and 42A of the Constitution of Kenya are as follows
3
: 
 To determine and review constituencies‟ boundaries and names at eight-to-ten 
year intervals.  The function similarly applies with respect to the local authorities.  
Section 10 of the Local Government Act (Cap. 265) also gives power to the ECK 
to divide local authorities into various electoral areas and prescribe their 
boundaries and names. 
  To register voters and maintain and revise the voter register 
 To direct and supervise the presidential, parliamentary, and local government 
elections 
 To promote free and fair elections 
 To promote voter education throughout Kenya 
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 To carry out any other functions as may be prescribed by parliament 
 
The National Assembly and Presidential Election Act expands on ECK functions stating 
that it deal with
4
:   
 Matters related to registration of voters 
 Regulations relating to the protocols on election procedures 
 The code of conduct for campaigns (See previous chapter) 
 Procedures related to elections after a vacancy 
 Election expenses 
 And dispute resolution 
 
In theory the ECK is operationally independent from governmental structures in that it 
recruits its own staff all the way down to the grassroots level and does not depend on any 
existing local administration structures.
5
  The ECK deals solely in an administrative 
capacity when dealing with complaints regarding elections, going only as far as ordering 
recounts and retallies if requested by candidates or parties.
6
  See Table 2 in Appendix V 
for a breakdown of the institutional responsibilities for key electoral functions.  The ECK 
currently has no capacity to deal with issues of the media except for being consulted for 
free airtime delegated to political parties.  The Electoral Code of Conduct to which all 
parties subscribe is essentially unenforceable by the ECK based on its current capacities.
7
  
These restrictions on the ECK‟s ability to perform the tasks assigned to it have made it a 
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relatively weak institution to date.  The events of the 2007 elections have done nothing to 
strengthen this. 
 
Section B- The Election: Where Was the ECK? 
The 2007 elections were different from previous elections in one very distinct 
way: the violence that was triggered after the election was not about land, it was about 
rigged voting.
 8
  Although there was perceived deception by the other political party, 
what made the 2007 elections slightly different was that this time the blame was largely 
placed on the perceptible collusion of the ECK with the incumbent party.  Issues 
surrounding the ECK were wide spread from mishandling the vote count, to scattered 
voter registration, to the lack of ability to deal with the media and new technology, to 
poor electoral dispute management.   
 Conceivably the biggest issue that resulted from the 2007 elections was the 
resulting perception of the ECK: “neither political parties nor voters regard the Electoral 
Commission and the wider state administrative system as neutral.”9  This perceived loss 
of neutrality and institutional independence undermined the foundations and actions of 
the ECK.  President Kibaki showed a blatant disregard for the institutional independence 
of the ECK by replacing some of the members just days before the election, conceivably 
a pre-planned approach to rig the elections if necessary.
10
  While this was within his 
power, the action looked very suspicious to the opposition party and outside observers.  
                                                             
8 Susan Kilonzo, "Ethnic Minorities Wedged Up in Post-Election Violence in Kenya: A Lesson for African 
Governments," Critical Arts: A South-North Journal of Cultural & Media Studies 23, no. 2 (07, 2009): 245. 
9 Southall, 448.  
10 Kilonzo, 245. 
66 
 
Kibaki placed 15 new members on the ECK in 2007 alone.
11
  The damage done to the 
legitimacy of the ECK during the elections will impact its ability to perform its functions 
in elections to come and little has been done to restore its credibility in the intervening 
years. 
The ECK was also undermined in the performance of its duties before and after 
the elections.  One of the issues the ECK faced stemmed from the challenge to handle the 
large increase in voters.  The ECK had to double the number of voting stations to 27,555 
and organized around 20,000 polling centers.
12
  This large increase in voting centers and 
voter registration responsibility in and of itself inundated the ECK.  The Report on the 
Independent Review Commission (IREC) on the General Elections headed by Judge 
Johann Kriegler of South Africa (also known as the Kriegler Commission and referred to 
as such throughout the paper), found the ECK to be: “technically and administratively 
incompetent, disproportionately expensive, and incapable of undertaking the fundamental 
task of efficiently registering voters (for instance, an estimated 1.2 million deceased 
voters were still on the electoral list).”13  The inclusion of numerous dead in the voter 
register was far from the only numerical issue the ECK faced.  Many constituencies 
experienced an abnormal voter turnout.  It is considered statistically abnormal to have a 
voter turnout higher than 85% but in areas there was a voter turnout of over 100%.
14
  This 
was a clear indication of ballot stuffing, denoting collusion between polling staff and 
likely the members of political parties. The implications of such actions are in the 
Kriegler Commission Report which stated the “irrefutable conclusion that the ECK was 
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not able to manage counting, tallying and results announcement processes in such a way 
that it secured the integrity of the electoral process at either the presidential or the 
parliamentary level.”15  The integrity of the whole electoral process was jeopardized 
when these results were made public.  The ECK‟s contribution to the ethnic political 
violence that resulted after the election results were announced can be seen in the manner 
in which the disputed electoral results were handled.  It has been widely agreed that the 
ECK mishandled the vote counting, the ECK‟s chair of the Electoral Commission, 
Samuel Kivuitu, even conceding that irregularities in voting had occurred.
16
  However, 
the larger issue of concern was Kivuitu‟s “damning admission” just after Kinaki was 
declared president that “he had been subject to undue pressure, and that he could not say 
with certainty that Kibaki had actually won the poll.”17  This confession and poor vote 
counting practices undermined the ECK‟s credibility.18   
In addition, the ECK‟s attempts at voter education actually brought ethnicity to 
the forefront of the voters‟ minds through its anti-violence and leadership campaigns.  
Although these educational campaigns were intended to raise voter awareness about bad 
election practices (such as intimidation for votes) and what a leader should be, the 
campaigns did more harm than good by reinforcing old grievances between ethnic 
groups.
19
  The material reinforced the idea that ethnicity was the main basis for choosing 
a party/candidate.  Ethnicity was also increasingly brought to attention with the increased 
role of independent media in reporting on the elections and candidates.      
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The media played a large role in informing the people of the obvious injustices 
that had occurred. One of the biggest positives, and conversely negatives, stemmed from 
the increased coverage of the election via FM radio.  This allowed people to listen to 
election coverage from a source other than the government and also allowed many people 
to listen to broadcasts in their native languages.
20
  The major negative was the increased 
difficulty in controlling faulty information from reaching the public who were not always 
equipped to distinguish fact from fiction.  It also harked back to Rwanda in 1994 and the 
use of the radio to incite violence.  While the media can be a source of good information, 
it can also be a source that incites hate.  The ECK did try to prevent negative situations 
by accrediting 2,964 local and international journalists to cover the 2007 elections.
21
  
These journalists were not only given ECK election kits, which included Media 
Guidelines, but they were also briefed by the ECK.  This training and orientation was 
carried out by the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) in consultation with the United 
Nations Development Programme‟s (UNDP) Media and Election Project.22  The Media 
Act of 2007 (established by the MCK) also sought to maintain the freedom of expression 
as well as the freedom to receive ideas and information, while at the same time promoting 
self-regulation of the media by emphasizing the code of conduct set out for journalists
23
, 
however, accreditation and training only meant so much.  Two of the ECK‟s media 
guidelines that were violated have direct correlation to the abuse of ethnicity.  The first 
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was that responsible media provides fair and impartial coverage to all contestants and the 
second was resisting bribery.
24
   
The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) received a great deal of criticism 
during the 2007 elections. Widely regarded as an arm of the government, the station was 
accused of favoring the PNU.
25
  Its establishment, management, operations, and funding 
were all constituted in the government.  This biased source caused further outrage to the 
Kenyan people with its, and solely its, documentation of the swearing-in of the president.   
However, the KBC was not the only media outlet that showed a bias towards 
certain candidates/parties/ethnic groups.  The ECK could not monitor all sources of 
information and even if it could have, the current freedom of expression laws would have 
limited the amount of censorship the ECK could enforce.  Opinion polls also played a 
large part in promoting division between parties and ethnic groups as results were often 
computed in a way to endorse the desired result.  The biases of information through the 
media and the manipulation of the opinion polls further created ethnic hostilities as voters 
did not know what information to believe, thus, it was easy to fall back on the comfort 
and trust found in one‟s own ethnic group and the familiarity of past behavior.     
Adding to the ensuing chaos was the ECK‟s denial that it was the credible 
mechanism to deal with electoral disputes, admonishing that the courts were/should be 
responsible.
26
  The ODM, however, refused to take the issue to the courts, rightfully 
pointing out that the courts were controlled by Kibaki as he had nominated six judges 
(two to the Court of Appeal and four to the High Court) just a few days prior to the 
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election date.
27
  The quick swearing-in of President Kibaki also promoted the eruption of 
violence and highlighted fraudulent actions that had occurred in the election.  
 
Section C- Reform Options 
The Kriegler Report identified three basic problems that confront those organizing 
elections: credibility, sustainability, and efficiency.
28
  All three of these problems were 
encountered by the ECK as a result of the 2007 elections.  By addressing institutional 
independence, management and implementation practices, the media, and electoral 
disputes, the ECK can begin the long road to recovery.  The following paragraphs delve 
into these more deeply. 
 
Institutional Independence 
Currently, the members of the ECK are not only appointed by the President, but 
the President is not required to consult with any other institutions or people while 
considering nominees.
29
  This must change.  It is not the first time the issue of ECK 
presidential appointment has been raised.  Prior to the 1997 election, pressures from both 
political parties and civil society helped create an alternative agreement known as the 
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG).
30
  In the IPPG, the parliamentary opposition 
would provide the president with a list of nominees from which he would appoint ten to 
the ECK.
31
  During Kibaki‟s presidency, as ECK members concluded their terms or died, 
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he simply replaced them without reference to the IPPG accord.
32
  One available option is 
to re-implement the IPPG accord and enforce it through the law and court systems.  
Another option that would require working through the National Assembly would be the 
creation of a committee of MPs represented proportionally by the party numbers in the 
National Assembly who would appoint ECK members.  This system would take the IPPG 
accord and expand it by putting all of the duty in the hands of MPs.  Ideally it would 
promote the interests of all political parties in parliament, including smaller parties of the 
opposition, allowing all parties to have a say.  A final option would be to remove the 
nomination of ECK completely away from the government by having an outside 
organization appoint members.  The ultimate goal of each of these options would be to 
increase the independence of the ECK so that the public would not see it as a biased 
institution.   
 
Management and Implementation  
 Recommendations by the Kriegler Commission covered many issues regarding 
management and application of electoral practices that fall under its current 
Constitutional duties.  These included:  
Upgrading the competence of the ECK or completely replacing it, provide 
for post-election audits of results (preferably by an independent body).  It 
also recommended the establishment of an appropriately empowered 
dispute resolution court, a transition between a successful candidate‟s 
election and swearing in, safe electronic storage of election materials and 
results until a post-election audit has been conducted, inclusion of 
measures for the representation of underrepresented groups (notably 
women), and consideration of the merits of fixed terms of office for 
president and parliament.
33
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While there are many options for reform, some of the focus for the ECK in the future 
needs to be on better training for its employees, especially temporary employees brought 
in during elections.  There also needs to be new mechanisms for holding these employees 
accountable for their actions so they do not give in to practices of corruption such as 
bribery, however, these will likely prove difficult and will take time.  The ECK can, 
however, immediately address some of the issues associated with voter registration, voter 
education, and the enforcement of electoral codes of conduct, and in fact must address 
them quickly in order to begin the process of repair with the public. 
The ECK has previously used two main methods of registering voters, continuous 
registration and drive registration.  Continuous registration is needed as new people 
become eligible to vote, people move, and others pass away.  Drive registration typically 
occurs right before elections in attempts to increase the number of voters by seeking out 
people who have not yet registered.  This is often done by political parties trying to gain 
as much support as possible before the election.  1.7 million new people were registered 
as voters during 2007 leading up to the elections
34
  The problem with combining these 
two methods in Kenya is that the ECK lacks the capacity (or will) to continuously update 
Kenya‟s register to represent not only the influx of new people but the changes that have 
occurred in the voter registry since the last election.  This has opened the door for 
corruption, allowing dead people to vote resulting in voter turnout over 100%.  The ECK 
has a few options to help rectify the current chaotic voter registry.  It could scrap its 
entire register and try to start by requiring people to register with their national ID cards. 
It could use the downtime between elections to go through and combine its registries to 
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ensure there is no overlap and remove people who are deceased or have moved.  Or it can 
continue using its current system with black books and high probability of corruption.  
An increase in the number of voters can have both a positive and a negative side.  
Increased participation by the citizens is positive; however, if voter registration is a target 
for political corruption, then it is a negative, especially if it targets certain ethnic groups.  
With the increased participation of Kenyan society in these past elections, the 
ECK needs to embrace its role as a promoter of voter education to help limit ethnicity 
from being the foundation upon which people vote.  While the ECK attempted to do this 
with its anti-violence and leadership campaigns to discourage negative election practices, 
the reality was they brought many of these issues to the forefront of voters‟ minds.  
Eliminating such campaigns is one option, leaving civil society to educate voters, but this 
runs the risk of misinformation being distributed and it would be difficult to control any 
ethnic appeal these campaigns might make to the voters.  If the ECK continues these 
types of campaigns, it will need to give examples that do not rely on ethnicity to portray 
the point.  For example, a campaign showing parents, teachers, school administrators, and 
local and national government officials collaborating to develop new educational 
programs regarding youth participation in elections.  The challenge lies exactly in what 
the principles behind elections are: “Elections are said to be free if the voters clearly 
understand the election process and are able to exercise their political rights free of threat 
from intimidation and in secrecy.”35  The word intimidation automatically brings about 
feelings around ethnicity since that has been the principle tool of violence and fear in the 
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past.  While the past cannot be changed, ethnicity does not have to be a tool of political 
organizations in voter education.  
 Finally, ethnic hostilities have largely continued to be manifested in elections due 
to the lack of ECK enforcement of its current mandates presented by the Electoral Code 
of Conduct.  The lack of mechanisms and resolve to enforce the code of conduct has 
perpetuated ethnicity as a campaign tool of political parties who face little chance of 
reprisal from the ECK.  The ECK either needs to be given more resources and authority 
to pursue abuse of the code of conduct by political parties and also the media (see below) 
or a new institution or court system needs to be created.  At this point in time, it would be 
unreasonable to assume that political parties and other institutions will monitor 
themselves and hold each other accountable since these abuses have become such 
common practice and frankly, highly effective tools that politicians do not want to give 
up.      
 
The Media and Information 
 The increasing media component, evident in the 2007 elections, encouraging 
ethnic division will continue to get worse as the internet, cell phones, and social networks 
increase the quick and wide spread of information.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the ECK‟s ability to monitor and curb media abuses that propagate ethnic tensions needs 
to be legally granted by Parliament.  The media recommendations in this chapter focus on 
the role and responsibilities of the ECK beyond its role in monitoring hate speech as 
previously discussed.   
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Disputed Elections 
 The lack of an institution to deal with the disputed election results was a 
significant factor that lead to the mass post-election violence.  One of the key areas of 
electoral reform needs to be defining who is in charge of disputed elections from the 
primary level all the way to the national level.  This is not an area that can be left 
unresolved.  If it is the ECK‟s responsibility, then new mechanisms to deal with these 
issues quickly and impartially need to be established.  If public trust in the ECK is too 
small at the moment to have it resolve disputes, then some kind of judicial court system 
needs to be created to deal with electoral disputes.   
Mexico and South Africa provide two different examples for different approaches 
to handling electoral disputes.  Mexico has established its own electoral tribunal that has 
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to elections.
36
  One of the downsides of this approach is 
that establishing a separate tribunal is extremely costly as it requires a whole new set of 
administrative costs as opposed to if it worked within already established judicial or 
electoral structures.  South Africa has taken a slightly different approach, establishing a 
special electoral court that works within its judicial system.  The court is comprised of 
three senior members of the judiciary who do their routine work but are on standby in 
case an urgent electoral dispute arises.
37
  The concern with this approach for Kenya is 
that the public is very leery of its judicial system which is largely seen to be controlled by 
the president, thereby being perceived as a biased institution.  Whatever mechanism is 
established, it needs to ensure ethnic prejudices are absent so that it does not intensify 
hostilities.           
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Section D- Recommendation 
 With the ever increasing importance of elections in Kenya, it is critical to have an 
institution that focuses specifically on elections, that is separate from other governmental 
institutions and is seen as a separate entity from the government in the sense that the 
people know it is ultimately promoting and keeping their best interests in mind.  The 
promotion of truth and accuracy should be the ECK‟s top priorities.  Ultimately success 
of the ECK lies in its ability to perform its functions according to these criteria
38
: 
 How transparent all is processes are 
 How simple and accessible its procedures and service are to all 
 How much it respects the principles of equity as a measure of ensuring free and 
fair elections 
 How well it asserts its independence 
 How well prepared it is for all its activities 
 How well it anticipates and deals with any electoral disputes and hitches 
 How well it keeps learning from its experiences for the improvement of its 
processes 
 How well it can enforce or ensure enforcement of its decisions and processes 
 
Each of these will help shift the focus from any ethnic or biased view of the ECK.  From 
these observations, the following recommendations will be examined in regards to ECK 
reform: increased institutional independence of the ECK, improving current management 
practices already delegated to the ECK, new laws regarding the ECK‟s control and input 
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on media and technology, and finally, to better define the role of the ECK in election 
disputes and create new mechanisms to deal with electoral disputes post-election. 
 
Institutional Independence 
If the people are ever going to put their trust in the ECK, it needs to gain 
institutional independence from not only the government (specifically the president), but 
also from the pressures of other political institutions.  This process should begin with 
repealing the President‟s ability to appoint the chairman and other commissioners of the 
ECK.  There needs to be distance between powers of the president and the mechanisms 
that determine who will be the next president.  By allowing the president to appoint 
members to the ECK, it is opening up the temptation for an already high existence of 
corruption to become even greater.  This corruption impedes justice by increasing the 
likelihood that the ECK consists of members of the president‟s political party, which 
means that the president is likely appointing people he/she feels will support him no 
matter what, which means it is probably a member of the president‟s own ethnic group.  
This inbreeding will lead the public to doubt the ECK as a fair institution, thus 
undermining any of the results it produces.  While it would be ideal for ECK members to 
be appointed by a non-governmental institution that does not have any sort of political 
aspirations, such an institution does not exist and would be difficult to create, maintain, 
and monitor.  The next best option would be to have ECK members appointed by MPs 
based on a committee that is represented proportionally by the party numbers in the 
National Assembly.  This would provide for an institution that is already established and 
already involved in the ECK (as it established laws for the role and conduct of the ECK) 
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to monitor its appointees in case of misconduct.  Proportional representation would also 
help ensure that member of the ECK represented all/or at least a majority of political 
interests, thereby increasing equity, fairness, and hopefully trust in the ECK.  These 
attributes would in turn limit corruption, facilitating decreasing tensions between ethnic 
groups; however, this would be rather complex to coordinate.  Until the National 
Assembly is more representational of Kenya‟s populace, the best course of action for the 
time being would be to re-implement the IPPG accord, which was established before the 
1997 elections, and put it into law so it could be enforced.  The IREC‟s most recent 
recommendation was that only three to nine Commissioners would be appointed by the 
President and approved by Parliament.
39
  It has limited the number of appointees as a 
result of what it perceives to be as an overly large commission; however, the following 
recommendations for expanding the ECK‟s role in elections would necessitate a large 
institution.  Since elections are the cornerstone for nation-building, and the ECK is the 
institute that monitors these elections, it needs to be given the capacity to act effectively.  
As both political parties and civil society promoted the IPPG in 1997, public acceptance 
of this would likely be high, helping establish more legitimacy for the ECK. 
In addition, another factor that needs to be evaluated in consideration of appointed 
members is the length of their term and status in the ECK.  Renewable five year terms are 
worthy of continuation as it allows members to serve on the ECK for a full election cycle 
to experience the entire process and also expertise to develop which will help contribute 
to reform of the ECK over time.  The timing of the introduction of new members, 
however, should be changed.  New members should be brought in between elections not 
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right before or after them.  Training new members should occur during a period that is 
not overly stressful or with high political activity.  Learning while on the job is necessary 
but not in a period of such high tensions when mistakes can be very costly.  This would 
also allow MPs to settle into their new terms before making appointment decisions.  The 
practice of tenure also needs re-evaluation as the current practices aimed at establishing 
justice are missing the mark since removal is essentially impossible.
40
  Like MPs or any 
other institution, members of the ECK need to be held responsible for their actions.  If a 
member accepts bribe money or slanders an ethnic group, they need to be held 
accountable for their actions and removed so that trust in the ECK by the public is not 
lost.  This would need to be provided for in a legal framework.  
Even if ECK members are not appointed by the president, it will never truly be an 
independent institution until it is no longer financially dependent on the government.
 41
  
Financial dependence, especially through the president, can lead to control of the ECK by 
the president, who may force the ECK to comply with its donors‟ demands.  One way to 
help with this situation would be to have political parties finance the ECK, each 
contributing the same amount of money.  This would ensure that all political parties 
would be interested in the ECK running efficiently and fairly; however, this raises an 
issue for smaller parties or parties that do not have the financial means to contribute.  
Because of this, it might be beneficial for the time being that foreign governments/aid 
donors fund the ECK until a better system of taxation might be applied that would be 
designated for the ECK without conditions or strings attached.
42
  At any rate, the funding 
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for the ECK should not be controlled by one person or constituency in the government 
that could pressure members to act in an unscrupulous manner.  While this is a function 
the government should cover the expenses for, getting other parties involved initially 
might help increase its legitimacy until a time comes when the government does not use 
money to apply pressure on these institutions.  ECK institutional independence means 
that its members are concerned with the wellbeing of all members of society and thus 
pursue actions that will enhance the welfare of the people.  By enhancing the 
independence of the ECK, it will limit accusations from political parties that the 
institution is biased, and thus supporting certain ethnic groups while suppressing others.  
It will also begin the process of decreasing the magnitude of presidential powers, helping 
Kenya to shift away from one person domination who is often ethnically motivated.     
 
Management and Implementation 
 By improving the day to day processes of voter registration, voter education and 
outreach, and enforcing electoral codes of conduct, the ECK can instigate change in the 
electoral process away from ethnicity.  Ethnic hostilities have become so embedded in 
Kenyan society that it will take work from the most basic principles of the electoral 
system to begin to create change in the whole system. 
 The simple act of voter registration is one area where the ECK can show that 
someone‟s ethnicity has no bearing.  Everyone should and has the right to vote.  The 
present chaos of the voter registry however makes this challenging.  Between all the 
records from continuous registration and drive registration, it is difficult for the ECK to 
say that certain ethnic groups are not overly represented in the registrar.  There needs to 
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be an overhaul of the system despite the costs associated with such an action.  In order to 
get a hold on the voter registration, which has become a prime source of corruption by 
political parties (these political candidates using votes to promote ethnic hatreds), an 
accurate resemblance of the voter population needs to be recorded. One place to start this 
process would be using other national population databases to get information regarding 
the Kenyan population.  For example, the national ID card has been proposed as a way 
not only to determine eligibility for voting, but to establish a method of verification when 
voting.  The ECK can start by cross checking its current registry with a listing from the 
national database that issued the ID cards.  The voting registers from all the 
constituencies need to be compiled into one list that the ECK can reference.  While this is 
a huge undertaking, perhaps some of the temporary workers hired for elections could be 
hired to begin this process.  That would provide jobs and help increase accountability of 
these workers (obviously there would need to be a background check of the workers to 
try and determine their trustworthiness).  By having these people work in groups that 
represent a plethora of political parties, they would hold each other accountable to make 
sure the data is not manipulated.  Having these different groups work together for the 
common good is just one step in promoting civic nationalism.  Verification of the 
information acquired by the voter would need to occur, but the key for the ECK will be to 
go to the voters to get information instead of having voters come to the ECK.  If the ECK 
shows an effort to obtain accurate information, without putting undue pressure or burden 
on voters, it will help initiate a foundation of trust and hopefully respect.  An accurate 
voter registry will help solidify the results that the ECK posts enhancing its credibility in 
the eyes of the voters which will enable it to work with voters in other areas.  It is in these 
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other areas that the ECK can start to shift voter focus away from ethnicity as the 
determinate of elections.          
 While the ECK has previously focused on voter education right before elections, 
there is a great deal that it can do in the downtime between elections.  Civil society has 
increasingly taken an interest in educating voters with the rise of NGOs.
 43
  Because the 
ECK cannot handle voter education by itself, it would be important that it provide 
training for and accredit these civil organizations so that voters are not only getting 
accurate information but they also know who they can get trustworthy information from.  
The campaigns these organizations promote need to focus not only on the importance of 
voting or of presenting the issues to the people, but they need to do so in a way that 
emphasizes the importance of voting for community interests.
 44
  The key then is to 
connect these interests to national interests.  The whole process needs to be seen as 
something that is good for everyone.  This process could commence by teaching voting 
principles in primary and secondary schools.
45
  Teaching the history of elections and the 
negative role that ethnicity played in the deaths and violence that occurred as a result to 
younger generations would hopefully take away the emphasis of ethnicity in elections in 
the future.  By working with civil society, schools, and directly with people, the ECK 
could begin to build bridges with Kenyan society to increase its legitimacy and to begin 
the process of eliminating ethnicity from elections. 
 Through many acts, including the Electoral Code of Conduct and the Election 
Offences Act, the ECK already has mechanisms in place that state what appropriate 
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behavior is during elections.  Hate speech and practices regarding ethnic discrimination 
are clearly in violation of these acts.  However despite the ECK‟s allowance to pursue 
courses of action against violators by having the Attorney-General prosecute them, the 
offences committed during the election went relatively unpunished.
46
  By not stopping 
these practices, the ECK is only letting ethnic hatred practices to continue to prevail in 
elections.  As such, the ECK needs to begin to enforce the acts that protect society from 
not only direct hate speech by political parties and the media but actions that prompt 
ethnic violence.  Part of the ECK‟s staff needs to be focused and trained on dealing with 
the electoral code of conduct.  This sector of the ECK should be the first step in 
penalizing parties that violate ethics of the electoral process.  What these penalties would 
be needs to further research and would depend on the severity and situation, but the 
message that needs to be sent out is that any practices that purposefully put down, 
intimidate, or harass an ethnic group will not be tolerated.  If punishment at the level of 
the ECK does not work then the next step would be sending the violating parties to the 
electoral disputes court (see section Electoral Disputes below).  Without a system that 
penalizes political parties, the media, and other actors in authority positions for wielding 
ethnicity as a power tool, then the system will only perpetuate the cycle.  The ECK can 
become one of the many institutions it will take to curb the use of ethnicity in politics in 
Kenya.           
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The Media and Information 
The ECK‟s increased involvement in the media and the dissemination of electoral 
information will be a key component in prosecuting parties that violate electoral codes of 
conduct. The 2007 elections saw the emergence of the information age in the election 
process as communication to the electorate through technology and the increased 
participation of youth resulted in information flooding.
47
  As Peter Kagwanja and Roger 
Southall quoted: “Never before had Kenyan voters been privy to so much election-related 
information, and never had it been harder to sort facts from fiction.”48  While it would be 
impossible for the ECK to moderate all forms of media and technology, the first step to 
address these issues will be to form a close partnership with the MCK and the KBC.  By 
increasing the number and scope of institutions that can monitor the abuse of ethnicity in 
the media, the ECK can work on its ability to enforce media abuse in elections.  The 
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation Act, which holds there should be an equal allocation of 
expression of different political views in the media, should be amended so the ECK has 
the power to compel KBC to act in accordance with the law regarding elections.  The 
KBC has a history of unfair allocation.
49
  By working through legitimate mechanisms that 
give power to the ECK to enforce biased media practices, the KBC would have to comply 
if it wants public opinion to change.  Since the KBC is a huge media outlet in Kenya, the 
ability of the ECK to work with it as opposed to against it eventually would help the ECK 
promote fair election practices.   
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In coordination with the KBC and MCK, the ECK could also increase its 
accreditation of sources of information from newspapers to organizations, helping voters 
to distinguish between reliable and potentially unreliable sources of information.  This 
would entail the ECK addressing corruption that may be present in such sources such as a 
government run newspaper or media broadcasting center.  Such sources of information 
would need to be taken with a grain of salt and voters would need to be aware of this 
potential bias.
50
  In order to reach people of all backgrounds and groups, part of the 
accreditation process should be accrediting a wide range of journalists and media 
personnel who speak a plethora of languages to cover as many regions of Kenya as 
possible.  This might extend to the ECK providing a translation service or having the 
MCK provide translation services during elections in order to provide people from all 
over with accurate information.  Lists of accredited journalists and translators would need 
to be circulated throughout Kenya with an ECK seal of acknowledgment and these 
members would need to have credentials when out in the field so their authenticity could 
be verified easily by the people.  This would obviously be a huge undertaking, but the 
ECK has already shown its willingness to accredit and train media during the past 
elections.  By working with the MCK, the ECK could increase its efficiency and 
effectiveness in this venture by limiting discrimination practices in providing and 
producing information regarding elections. 
The publication of information throughout the 2007 elections caused much of the 
ethnic violence that occurred.  The ECK should establish guidelines for verifying data 
before it is published in any capacity, including advertisements, polling results, and 
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especially election results.
51
  The elections saw an increase in the use of opinion polls as 
the independent polling industry grew.
52
  Based on politician and public use and reliance 
on opinion polls leading up to the election, the ECK needs to monitor polling companies 
to ensure the data is accurate and reliable.  This could help voters make an informed 
decision, knowing that polls are not being manipulated.  The ECK can do this, for 
example, by setting standards for sampling techniques to make sure that practices are 
consistent.  This should help limit extreme variance in polls which has been argued to 
have contributed to political instability.
53
  Like journalists and other media sources, the 
ECK can accredit polling agencies that follow the standards set by the ECK so the public 
can know it is viewing respectable information.  Accreditation of any sort from media 
outlets to journalists to polling companies should be approached with caution by the ECK 
as bribery and corruption could easily come into play.  With a history of political parties 
and candidates paying off people for votes, it would be easy for such groups to buy off 
members of the ECK in order to get accreditation.  While there is no quick fix for this 
issue, it is something for the ECK to be aware of as it expands it role of monitoring and 
verifying other organizations involved in the electoral process to limit ethnic abuses.  
 
Disputed Elections 
 The major reason people resorted to violence after the election results were 
revealed was because they lacked a legitimate institution to bring their quarrel to.  The 
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ECK needs to be the first stop in dealing with any electoral disputes.  One of the ways to 
avoid some of these disputes is to be very cautious in its publication of election results.  
Using concepts such as “partial” or “progressive” results from different constituencies 
can help limit disputes by not announcing results and then changing the results later.
54
  
This would have helped with the 2007 elections, but there still would have been a dispute 
as the issues went deeper than simply how results were given.  When these matters 
cannot be resolved by the ECK or if matters involve the ECK, then per the 
recommendation of the IREC, it would be beneficial for a new law to establish an 
Electoral Dispute Resolutions Court to handle appeal matters.
55
  Such a court would be 
very beneficial especially if the dispute was time sensitive.  One of the main issues this 
court would handle would be post-election disputes including election petitions.  These 
petitions would need to be filed in a timely manner and any current rules and regulations 
regarding procedures of election petitions would need to be repealed or replaced.  The 
IREC made a recommendation of six months as plenty of time to file a petition post-
election.
56
  The financial implications of this action are obvious, but such an established 
system is necessary in order to deal with disputes in an orderly and productive fashion 
rather than resorting to violence as occurred after the 2007 elections when the ECK 
refused to take responsibility for dealing with contention.  If Kenya were to take the 
South African route, of an electoral court within the judicial system, the question would 
become which justices would be chosen to serve?  One of the main arguments for having 
Kenyan‟s electoral court be separate from the judiciary is that: “in a highly politicized 
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society such as Kenya, where judicial impartiality has already been doubted, the judiciary 
should not be unnecessarily exposed to the risk of being politicized, or being seen to be 
politicized, by its involvement in political disputes.”57  There is also the issue that by 
pushing electoral dispute to the Judiciary, the ECK would only be moving justice farther 
away from the parties involved.
58
  As such, it is in the best interest of the ECK to 
establish its own electoral disputes court to deal with not only election result disputes but 
abuses of electoral codes of conduct that cannot be addressed at lower levels of the ECK.  
The “justices” appointed to this court could come from members of the ECK who have 
experience with law in some capacity or they could be appointed by MPs.  There is even 
the option of having the public vote for the justices on the national ballot in the future.  
For the time being, it might be simplest to have the Interim Independent ECK appoint 
people to the court.  With the creation of this court would come a great deal of 
responsibility as it would be imperative to not lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the people 
because once it did it would be very hard to restore, especially based on how the ECK 
handled the disputes that resulted from the 2007 elections.  With the new institution 
starting fresh, it would be crucial that it was viewed as independent of the government, 
political parties, and any particular ethnic group.  The successful creation and 
implementation of a new electoral dispute court would help augment the ECK‟s 
neutrality and ability to handle elections in a fair way that promotes equality amongst all 
ethnic groups.     
In summary, it is crucial for the ECK to have the trust of the various stakeholders 
in Kenyan society.  Its reform would define how people perceive elections in the future.  
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If the ECK is seen as a fair and unbiased institution, the threat of violence in closely 
contested debates would diminish substantially as there would be little question about the 
accuracy of the results.  In this simple way an independent ECK could help mitigate 
ethnic hostilities.
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Conclusion 
While it may be considered a small step, addressing flaws in the electoral process 
provides a place to begin shifting the Kenyan culture away from ethnic centric 
institutions and practices to those with a unified, national focus.  Simply establishing 
rules does not mean they will be followed (case in point, political parties following the 
Electoral Code of Conduct).  However, as can be seen throughout Northern Africa, the 
Middle East, and most recently in Uganda, discontent can breed a change movement.  
The discontent with the procedures and results of the 2007 elections provides a 
foundation for electoral reform to take hold in Kenya.  In this concluding chapter, the 
recommendations given in each of the core chapters will be presented as options that can 
immediately be implemented to address the role of ethnicity in political competition, then 
an examination of some of the challenges facing electoral reform will be addressed, and 
finally, some other future areas of reform will be discussed. 
Changing incentives from ethnic to civic in political competition begins with 
changing the structures that allow ethnicity to thrive.  As has been argued, changing the 
current voting system, the way political parties maneuver ethnicity, and the role of the 
ECK in elections are all ways that ethnicity in Kenyan society can be addressed.  The 
recommendations presented throughout this thesis were proposed because they can be 
implemented in the short term.  With the current FPTP system of voting, the losers will 
always challenge the results in elections since a majority of the vote is not required to 
win, resulting in doubt of who the Kenyan people actually want to represent them.  The 
closed list PR system promotes inclusivity of all groups and relies on a majority principle 
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to determine results.  If the current eight provinces are used in this system, there will be 
no need to draw new boundaries making its implementation immediate.   
If political parties are allowed to continue to use ethnicity as a political weapon in 
elections, they will continue to undermine elections as a legitimate institution: “Elections 
involve high stakes.  Their credibility is tied to national stability, and the winning and 
losing of elections is tied to political party power.”1  While it will take time to develop 
both the ECK and MCKs‟ abilities to monitor hate speech, the process can begin 
promptly by enhancing the laws that have already been established in the Electoral Code 
of Conduct.  By working with mechanisms already in place, monitoring hate speech by 
outlawing obvious abuses such as “Kenyans versus Kikuyu” can be started now before 
the next elections.  Beyond the promotion of ethnic division surrounding elections and 
the campaigning process, the basic structure of political parties creates concern for the 
future.  As most political parties are created from coalitions of ethnic groups prior to 
elections, one of the dangers is that a loss may be perceived by an ethnic group as a result 
of desertion by an ally within the coalition “ethnic groups that had „betrayed‟ them 
should be taught a lesson.”2  If members of the same political party are willing to turn on 
each other, the animosity towards opposition ethnic groups would only intensify the 
hostilities.  By developing rules and regulations for political parties and campaigning that 
remove the emphasis from ethnic groups which incite division, reform begins the process 
of political parties finding common interests to garner support that endorse civic interests.  
                                                             
1
 Republic of Kenya, 2008a. "Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections 
Held in Kenya on the 27th December, 2007," 32. 
2 Walter O. Oyugi, "Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in Kenya," African 
Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1997): 53. 
92 
 
Changing the basic structure of political parties will take a little more time to develop but 
steps toward this end can begin now.   
Finally, if the ECK is left unreformed it is very likely that the 2012 elections will 
produce similar results to that of 2007.  The ECK needs to take control of elections 
instead of elections taking control of the ECK.  The current instability of this institution 
to manage and organize elections contributes to the de-legitimization of elections as an 
institution.  It is the current unpredictability of elections that often leads Kenyans to join 
political parties based on ethnicity as way to protect their interests and maintain security.  
Stabilizing the ECK by reform and increasing its power will facilitate the development of 
an electoral system based on rules that can help limit the role of ethnicity in political 
competition.  The overarching electoral reform that needs to occur is changing the current 
electoral incentives that have lead to political mobilization around ethnic groups.  Both 
the salience of ethnicity as a political resource and the utility of resorting to violence need 
to be addressed.
3
  Many of the roles of the ECK are already defined on paper; therefore, 
the ECK can begin to actually carry out these roles immediately.  With the structure 
already in place, the steps for reform simply require courage and willingness to assume 
the authority already granted. 
When considering possible electoral reform in Kenya, it is crucial to remember 
political institutions are only part of the problem.  The role of culture in addressing 
ethnicity as a political tool is a key component with the issues deeply embedded in 
history.  While common citizens are often victimized in electoral violence, it is important 
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 Roger Southall, "Alternatives for Electoral Reform in Kenya: Lessons from Southern Africa," Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 449.  
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to recognize they are not guiltless.  The IREC emphasizes that the violence before and 
after the 2007 elections was not merely a result of the ECK, electoral institutions, or 
political leaders; the Kenyan people were just as implicit as they all engaged in: 
 Vote-buying and selling 
 Unapologetic use of public resources for campaigns 
 Participation by public servants in campaign activities of certain camps 
 Ballot-stuffing 
 Organizing marauding gangs and bully-boys to „zone‟ regions and electoral areas 
and intimidate opponents 
 Using and cheering and uploading hate speech and ethnic sentiments 
 Demonizing opponents and presidential candidates of opponent camps 
 Using sexist tactics and violence to keep women out of the race.4 
 
This is largely a result of the zero-sum mentality which has become associated with 
elections.  The promotion of ethnicity is currently a key component in political strategy 
and there needs to a shift towards “inter-ethnic integration, pluralism, tolerance, and 
mutuality.”5  However, this is not an easy task:  
Even as we recommend constitutional and legislative changes, it is 
important that Kenyans honestly assess all the activates relating to the 
2007 general elections so as to distinguish those that can be attributed to 
anomalies, failures and malpractices traceable to gaps or provisions in the 
Constitution and laws of Kenya from those that can be attributed to a bad 
                                                             
4 Republic of Kenya, 23-24. 
5 Aquiline Tarimo, “Politicization of Ethnic Identities: The Case of Contemporary Africa.” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies 45 (2010): 307. 
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culture encompassing impunity, disrespect for the rule of law and 
institutional incompetence.
6
 
 
The Kenyan electoral system is built upon ethnic foundations that have been embraced at 
all levels of society resulting in deadly consequences.  It is this infiltration of ethnic 
mindedness that will challenge some of the changes electoral reform creates.  
The likelihood of electoral reform faces many challenges already and is severely 
limited by the current power sharing government.  The power sharing government 
represents many dangers in and of itself:  
The resulting power-sharing government, enforced upon the ODM by 
Kibaki‟s intransigence, while preferable to the possible alternative of a 
collapse of the state into civil warfare, has set a dangerous precedent for 
the rest of Africa.  It has sent out the message that powerful losing parties 
need only to refuse to accept electoral outcomes by resorting to 
unconstitutional and violent action to ensure that the winning opposition is 
required to share power.  Power sharing may be an attractive alternative to 
violence, but may encourage incumbent regimes to rely on coercion to 
resist the will of the people and the transfer of power to electoral winners.
7
  
  
This power sharing arrangement is a temporary solution that needs to be remedied as 
quickly as possible or else instability in the next elections is likely to result in the same 
conflict.  Electoral reform can potentially provide a way of deterring a power-sharing 
government from resulting again but the likelihood is small: “With Kibaki, Odinga, and 
Musyoka all in government, the absence of an opposition party undermines reform 
efforts.”8  This is evidenced in the fact that the coalition government has yet to even 
                                                             
6 Republic of Kenya, 22-23. 
7 Southall, 445.  
8 Clark C. Gibson and James D. Long, "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Kenya, December 
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institute a new ECK.
9
  With internal motivation for electoral reform lacking, it may be up 
to some external pressure to get change started. 
Historically, motivating governments to focus on electoral reform has been 
challenging. One of the major problems of promoting electoral reform over other areas of 
reform is the lack of desire to address such issues.  Electoral reform does not receive the 
attention it should because it is not perceived as a significant change agent nor does it 
garner much press.  One will not become a hero by promoting electoral reform.  
Internally there is little appeal and externally there is even less as “major actors (notably 
the African Union and Western governments) engaged in addressing the Kenyan crisis 
have [neither] the desire or stomach to pursue a far-reaching agenda.”10  Incentives need 
to show the current electoral system is a threat to the political class and that change will 
be beneficial.
11
  Such a push for reform might only come if there is a repeat of the 
violence that was seen in 2007 in the next election in 2012.
12
  This could threaten the 
integrity of the country enough to encourage the political classes to make a change.  
However, electoral reform now, before the next elections, can stop unnecessary violence 
from even occurring.  What Kenya needs is a reason to make a change and embrace 
reform at this moment.  That reason should come from an understanding that other areas 
of reform, such as cultural matters, will take a long time to implement while electoral 
reform can begin to limit the negative role of ethnicity now.   
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10 Southall, 458. 
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Other areas of Kenyan society that foster ethnic divisions should be addressed as 
reforming these areas will be key support to and build upon electoral reform: “it would be 
absurd to think that electoral reform alone would address the ills of an over-powerful 
presidency, curb extra-state violence, restore the integrity of state institutions, re-orient 
political parties away from ethnic clientilism and, at the very least, somewhat reduce 
corruption.  Electoral reform could only be one step along a tortuous journey.”13  Some of 
the key areas that need to be reformed stem from Kenya‟s unique colonial history, and 
thus there is no generic cultural reform that can be applied that will eliminate the negative 
uses of ethnicity.  The issue of land and control has plagued Kenya for too long: “the land 
issue constitutes the major structural factor underlying ethnically driven electoral and 
political violence in Kenya.”14  This underlying dynamic has greatly increased ethnic 
divisions in Kenya and will continue to play a role unless addressed in a context that 
promotes the use of land as beneficial to all.  Reform at the educational level alongside 
cultural organizations will also need to occur in order to completely erase the ethnic focus 
surrounding Kenyan society.  These programs should focus on social cohesion where 
ethnic identities and cultural diversities are appreciated but do not dominate every aspect 
of life.
15
  The role of NGOs as well as churches will need to be relied on to implement 
change alongside the Kenya government.
16
  All of these areas are in need of further 
research. 
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While it is easy to say that all Kenya needs is “change” to halt the abuses of 
ethnicity in political competitions, change comes with difficulty.  Electoral reform is 
simply a stepping stone for the substantial change that needs to take place in regards to 
Kenyan views on ethnicity: “Elections must ultimately be a nation-building exercise, 
rather than a divisive one.  Since elections provide a means by which political power can 
change hands peacefully, they need to be managed in such a way as to deliver not only an 
arena for peaceful political contest but also to ensure general acceptance of outcomes and 
stability for other nation-building activities.”17  Elections provide a visible venue for the 
promotion of civic nationalism to begin.  With the 2012 elections just around the corner, 
if the issues surrounding electoral reform are not addressed and the power-sharing 
arrangement continues to accomplish little, there will be a repeat of the 2007 election 
complete with violence, death, further division, and significant disruption to the Kenyan 
economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
17 Republic of Kenya, 32. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
The eight Kenyan provinces: 1) Central, 2) Coast, 3) Eastern, 4) Nairobi, 5) North 
Eastern, 6) Nyanza, 7) Rift Valley, and 8) Western. 
 
 
 
 
Webster‟s Online Dictionary, “Kenya,” http://www.websters-online-
dictionary.org/definitions/Kenya?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01-
tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=Kenya&sa=Search#906 (accessed April 19, 
2011). 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Map of the Kenyan Districts: This does not represent the constituencies for voting.  The 
constituencies are currently in flux so a map would prove inaccurate.  However, it does 
show the discrepancy in size of the districts. 
 
 
 
 
 FAO Corporate Document Repository, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/t0737e/T0737E05.htm (accessed April 19, 2011). 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Breakdown of Kenyan provinces by ethnic group. 
 
 
 
 
 
BBC News “Kenya diplomatic push for peace.” 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7167363.stm> (accessed April 19, 2011). 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
 
Kagwanja, Peter and Roger Southall. "Introduction: Kenya - A Democracy in Retreat?" 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 267.  
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APPENDIX V 
Table 2. 
 
Republic of Kenya, 2008a. "Report of the Independent Review Commission on the 
General Elections Held in Kenya on the 27th December, 2007." 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/FinalReport_consolidated.pdf (accessed April 19, 
2011). 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
Table 3. 
 
 
Gibson, Clark C. and James D. Long. "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 
Kenya, December 2007." Electoral Studies 28, no. 3 (9, 2009): 499. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
104 
 
Bibliography  
"Responding to Kenya's Post-Election Violence." Alert 11, no. 7 (Spring 2008).  
Bates, Robert H. When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.  
BBC News. "Kenya Diplomatic Push for Peace." http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7167363.stm 
(accessed April 19, 2011).  
Eifert, Benn, Edward Miguel, and Daniel N. Posner. "Political Competition and Ethnic 
Identification in Africa." American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 2 (2010): 
494-510.  
FAO Corporate Document Repository. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/t0737e/T0737E05.htm (accessed April 19, 2011).  
Ferree, Karen and Jeremy Horowitz. "Ties that Bind? The Rise and Decline of Ethno-
Regional Partisanship in Malawi, 1994-2009." Democratization 17, no. 3 (06, 2010): 
534-563.  
Gibson, Clark C. and James D. Long. "The Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 
Kenya, December 2007." Electoral Studies 28, no. 3 (9, 2009): 497-502.  
Hyden, Goran, Dele Olowu, and Hastings W.O. Okoth Ogendo, ed. African Perspectives 
on Governance. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2000.  
Kagwanja, Peter. "Courting Genocide: Populism, Ethno-Nationalism and the 
Informalisation of Violence in Kenya's 2008 Post-Election Crisis." Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 365-387.  
Kagwanja, Peter and Roger Southall. "Introduction: Kenya - A Democracy in Retreat?" 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 259-277.  
Kanyinga, Karuti. "The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity and the 
Post-2007 Election Violence in Kenya." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 
27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 325-344.  
Kilonzo, Susan. "Ethnic Minorities Wedged Up in Post-Election Violence in Kenya: A 
Lesson for African Governments." Critical Arts: A South-North Journal of Cultural 
& Media Studies 23, no. 2 (07, 2009): 245-251.  
Lindberg, Staffan I. "Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among 
Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies." Government & Opposition 42, no. 2 
(Spring2007, 2007): 215-241.  
105 
 
M. Crawford Young. "Revisiting Nationalism and Ethnicity in Africa." (December 2004).  
McCrummen, Stephanie. "Ethnic Fault Lines Emerge in Kenya‟s Post-Election Turmoil." 
Washington Post, January 1, 2008.  
Oyugi, Walter O. "Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in 
Kenya." African Journal of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1997): 41-69.  
Republic of Kenya, 2008a. "Report of the Independent Review Commission on the 
General Elections Held in Kenya on the 27th December, 2007." 
Shulman, Stephen. "Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the 
Study of Nationalism." Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 5 (June 01, 2002): 
554-585.  
Southall, Roger. "Alternatives for Electoral Reform in Kenya: Lessons from Southern 
Africa." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (07, 2009): 445-461.  
Stroh, Alexander. "The Power of Proximity: A Concept of Political Party Strategies 
Applied to Burkina Faso." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 28, no. 1 (01, 
2010): 1-29.  
Tarimo, Aquiline. "Politicization of Ethnic Identities: The Case of Contemporary Africa." 
Journal of Asian & African Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 45, no. 3 (06, 2010): 
297-308.  
Webster's Online Dictionary. "Kenya." http://www.websters-online-
dictionary.org/definitions/Kenya?cx=partner-pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01-
tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-8&q=Kenya&sa=Search#906 (accessed April 19, 
2011). 
 
